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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1980s marked a decade of retrenchment in the Supreme Court's 
case law governing personal jurisdiction. 1 However, the Court subsequently 
avoided the issue for twenty years, from 1990 until 201 0 _2 The Court' s 
avoidance of the issue was noteworthy due to both a rapid expansion in 
Internet technology and liberalization of trade.3 No doubt, the Court' s 
hesitation was a result of deep divisions within the Court and Justice 
Stevens' idiosyncratic views,4 preventing the Court from achieving a clear 
majority on difficult issues.5 
Since Justice Stevens' retirement, the Court has returned to the topic 
and de"cided four personal jurisdiction cases, two in 2011 6 and two in 2014.7 
While the 2011 decisions have already produced considerable comrnentary,8 
the recent decisions - read in conjunction with the earlier decisions - call 
1 See discussion infra Part Ill. 
2 See discussion infra Part IV.a. 
3 See Nicastro v. Mcintyre Mach. Am. Ltd., 897 A.2d. 575, 589 (N.J. 2010) ("In the 
twenty-two years since Asahi, transnational commerce has accelerated, and we realize more 
than ever that we live in a global marketplace."), rev 'd, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (201 I). 
4 Rodger D. Citron, The Last Common Law Justice: The Personal Jurisdiction of Jus tice 
John Paul Stevens, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 433, 469 (2011) (hereinafter The Last Common 
Law Justice] ("Despite - or more likely because of - his refusal to provide a fifth vote to 
any opinion in Asahi or Burnham, the Supreme Court did not revisit the doctri nal disputes at 
issue in those cases until after Stevens retired."); Roger D. Citron, The Case of the Retired 
Justice: How Would Jus tice John Paul Stevens Have Voted in J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro?, 63 S.C. L. REv. 643, 644 (20 12) (hereinafter The Case of the Retired Justice]. 
5 See infra pp. 231-235. 
6 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); J. 
Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
7 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. I I 15 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 
(2014). 
R See generally John N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World: The Impact of 
the Supreme Court's Decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1707 (2013) (analyzing the Nicastro and Goodyear decisions and how they limit the ability of 
U.S. citizens to bring suit against foreign defendants for injuries); John T. Parry, Introduction: 
Due Process, Boarders, and the Qualities of Sovereignty - Some Thoughts on J. Mcintyre 
Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 827 (20 12) (providing a critical analysis 
of Nicastro and how it has confused the doctrine of general jurisdiction); Co llyn A. Peddie, Mi 
Casa es Su Casa: Enterprise Theory and General Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations 
After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 36 S.C. L. REv . 697 (20 12) 
(exploring the reasons for the Goodyear decision limiting jurisdiction and discussing the 
possible implications of this decision). 
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for more commentary.9 
The four most recent decisions are unusual in a number of ways. Three 
of the cases ~roduced near unanimity, with only one concurring opinion in 
those cases. As developed below, the Court's unanimity is surprising 
because the Court's case law suggests a continued retrenchment at a time 
when one might have expected the liberal wing of the Court to push for a 
longer jurisdictional reach for state and federal courts.11 In addition, in the 
Court's two general jurisdiction cases, Justice Ginsburg's opinions signal a 
significant narrowing of general jurisdiction.12 Had the Court simultaneously 
expanded courts' jurisdictional reach in specific jurisdiction cases, the 
narrowing of general jurisdiction might make sense. 13 But the two recent 
specific jurisdiction cases have not done so. 14 
The most troubling case is J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro. 15 It 
proved to be the most controversial, producing a deeply divided Court 
without a majority opinion. 16 But Justice Kennedy's four-justice plurality 
opinion suggests a major retrenchment, well beyond the retrenchment of the 
1980s. 17 Still in search for an independent rationale for the contacts part of 
the due process analysis, Justice Kennedy invokes notions of implied 
consent, a theory that has long been discredited.18 While his o~inion also 
suggests a congressional solution to the issue before the Court, 1 given the 
discord in Congress/0 his solution seems unrealistic. Finally, the plurality's 
extreme position is especially troubling in light of the division within the 
Court: while Justice Alito joined Justice Breyer's concurring opinion/' 
Justice Alito's usual alignment with the conservative wing of the Court does 
9 See, for example, Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant 
Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 
(forthcoming Fall 2014); Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The Supreme Court's New Approach to 
Personal Jurisdiction, SMU L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015), for some commentary that has been 
produced by these decisions. 
10 See infra Parts IV.b.i.A, IV.b .i.B, IY.b.ii.B, IV.b.ii.A. 
11 See discussion infra Part IY.b.ii. 
12 See d iscussion infra Parts IY.b.i.A, IY.b. i.B. 
13 See discussion infra Part IV.b.ii. 
14 See discussion infra Part IY.b.ii. 
15 J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
16 See discussion infra Part IY.b .ii.A. 
17 See infra pp. 260-262. 
18 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (2011); see infra p. 26 1-262. 
19 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790. 
20 Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz, The Roots of Congressional Discord, HUFF!NGTON 
POST (Oct. 18, 2013) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-debbie-wasserman-schultz 
/congress-discord_b_ 41 23823.html. 
21 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J. , concurring). 
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not bode well for future cases.22 If he was convinced to adopt Justice 
Kennedy's position, the personal jurisdictional reach of state courts will 
shrink to its shortest reach since the days prior to International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington at the same time as information and goods flow into states more 
freely than at any other time in history.Z3 
The jurisdictional reach of American courts is of special interest to 
foreign corporations that are intent on gaining access to markets in the 
United States. Foreign business representatives often exp.t:ess surprise when 
they encounter unique aspects of the American justice system; liberal 
discovery provides only one example.Z4 As a result, foreign corporate 
representatives may seek to avoid the jurisdiction of American courts. 
Seemingly, the Court's new case law provides a blueprint to do so.Z5 
This article explores how the Court's recent case law provides foreign 
corporations access to markets in the United States while allowing them to 
limit their vulnerability to jurisdiction in American courts. Part II provides a 
snapshot of the Court's case law in the modem era, beginning with a passing 
reference to Pennoyer v. Ne.Jf6 and moving to the period after International 
Shoe,21 when the jurisdictional reach of courts in the United States was 
dramatically extended.28 It discusses briefly a notable exception, Hanson v. 
Denckla,29 a case so obviously result-oriented that lower courts felt free to 
ignore its implications.3° Further, it discusses alternatives available to a 
plaintiff in need of a forum, including commencing suit by property 
attachment, invocation of general jurisdiction and consent.31 Part III 
discusses a series of cases, mostly in the 1980s, which signaled a 
22 General William K. Suter, Supreme Court Report, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 333, 337 
(20 12) ("The so-called consetvatives are the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito. Chief Justice and Justice Alito voted together about 95% of the time."); see also 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310,316 (2010) (Justice Kennedy 
delivered the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice 
Ali to). 
23 lnt'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 3 10 (1945). See also infra pp. 270-272. 
24 For example, some commentators suggest that UBS officials repeatedly ignored 
obligations under federal discovery rules because in their own system, they did not have to 
hand over documents that supported their opponents' cases and found compliance wi th such a 
rule inappropriate. See, e.g. , Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (imposing significant sanctions for obstructionist behavior). 
25 See discussion infra Part V. 
26 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 7 14 (1878). 
27 lnt 'l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310. 
28 See discussion infra Part II. 
29 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
30 See infra Part II.d. 
31 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 245; see also discussion infra Part II. 
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retrenchment by the Court?2 Part IV discusses the four Supreme Court cases 
decided since Justice Stevens' retirement.33 It concludes that the Court has 
shortened the jurisdictional reach of domestic courts at a moment in history 
when dramatic changes in communications and commerce bring Americans 
into contact with forei~ners and foreign corporations at rates never seen 
before in our history? Part V explores the implications of those four 
decisions for foreign corporations seeking to do business in the United States 
but hoping to avoid litigation in our courts?5 
II. P ERSONAL JURISDICTION: EXPANDING THE ARMS OF THE STATES 
A. A Short History 
In conversation with lawyers who are not procedural junkies, I hesitate 
to mention Pennoyer v. Neff, lest they storm out or zone out. I mention 
Pennoyer in passing because it brought Fourteenth Amendment due process 
analysis into the law governing personal jurisdiction.36 Scholars disagree 
about the original meaning of Pennoyer. 37 But as generally understood, the 
Court held38 that a state violated due process if it attempted to assert 
jurisdiction over a non-consenting non-resident unless the defendant was 
served in hand, in state. Relying primarily on an analogy from international 
law, the Court viewed states as separate sovereigns. As such, they exercised 
exclusive jurisdiction over individuals and property within their borders.39 
The corollary was that each state's jurisdictional arm ended at its borders.40 
In Pennoyer, the lower federal court had to determine whether the 
owner of property procured from a federal land grant could proceed against 
a defendant who purchased the land at a sheriffs sale pursuant to a default 
judgment entered against the owner.41 The Court found that the defendant 
could not rely on full faith and credit, requiring the second court to enforce 
32 See discussion infra Part III. 
33 See discussion infra Part IV.b. 
34 See discussion infra Part IV. 
35 See discussion infra Part V. 
36 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878). 
37 See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe's Half-
Buried Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561 (1995). 
38 One could argue that the discussion of due process was dicta. After all, the plaintiff in 
the original action filed suit before the effective date of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the 
Court's subsequent case Jaw makes clear that a state's assertion of personal jurisdiction must 
comport with due process. 
39 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. 
40 !d. 
41 /d. at 720. 
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the original judgment.42 It so held because the original judgment was 
procured without proper assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the 
property.43 Thus, the Court integrated the recently enacted Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause with prior restrictive practice, limiting 
states' jurisdictional reach. 
The underlying theory - that the Fourteenth Amendment protected one 
"sovereign" state's power from overreaching by another state - is 
analytically jarring. By its express terms, the Fourteenth Amendment is a 
limitation on state power, not a device to protect, for example, California 
from having Oregon reaching its jurisdictional ann into Califomia.44 
Treating the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting states' rights is to ignore a 
central message of the Civil War. As observed by one historian, until the 
Civil War, the United States was referred to in the plural. It was only during 
reconstruCtion that reference to the United States shifted to the singular. 
Lincoln himself made this shift, consciously using the term "nation" in place 
of "union" in the Gettysburg Address, evoking an ideal of the states as 
having one national identity rather than being a loose collective of 
. 45 
soveretgns. 
Despite Pennoyer's theoretical weakness, its rigid rule limiting 
jurisdiction seldom worked particular hardship on a plaintiff seeking to sue a 
defendant during at a time when travel was limited. In an agrarian society, 
individual defendants would most often be found near their homes.46 
Pennoyer recognized in dicta that special rules would prevail in other 
situations, including in cases involving corporations and other business 
entities. The Court suggested that a business entity might be forced to 
appoint an agent for the purposes of receiving process or to appoint a public 
official for the same purpose.47 
The industrial revolution, with expanded travel and commerce, created 
42 /d. at 729-30. 
43 /d. 
44 See Insurance Corp. of Ireland. v. Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
702-30 (1982), for the Court's eventual recognition that the Fourteenth Amendment is not a 
device to protect one state from another' s jurisdictional overreaching. 
45 JAY WIN!K, APRIL 1865: THE MONTH THAT SAVED AMERICA 250 (2001). Not only 
was Pennoyer's states' rights theory theoretically vulnerable, the Court itself seemed to 
recognize as much. Towards the end of the opinion, the Court discussed instances in which a 
court could assert jurisdiction even without satisfying the in-hand, in-state rule. Pennoyer, 95 
U.S. at 735-36. 
46 See Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REv. 
72 1, 749 (1988). ("Before the advent of modem transportation, when traveling was difficult 
and ties between jurisdictions were attenuated, courts justifiably were concerned that 
defendants could evade suit by avoiding forums in which potential plaintiffs resided"). 
47 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735. 
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situations where Pennoyer's restrictive holding created unfair situations.48 
For example, a plaintiff injured by a motorist from out-of-state would have 
to travel to the defendant's home state to sue if the defendant left the state 
before the plaintiff served the defendant with process. A plaintiff injured by 
a defective product shipped from out-of-state was also forced to sue in the 
defendant's home state as well. 
During the early years of the last century, states used different devices 
to expand the jurisdictional reach of their courts, including the now-widely 
rejected implied consent theory that allowed a state court to exercise 
jurisdiction over a person who conducted business in the state or used state 
highways.49 The need for such fictions changed with the Court's decision in 
International Shoe. 5° Instead of relying on the fiction of implied consent,51 
the Court expanded its quid pro quo theory from a case involving the 
assertion of jurisdiction based on state residency: a defendant who sought 
the benefits and protections of the Jaws of the forum state gives rise to the 
obligation to respond to suit in the forum state at least when the claim arose 
out of the activities in the forum state. 52 As a result, courts must examine the 
nature and quality of the defendant' s contacts with the forum state to 
determine whether the assertion of jurisdiction comports with " traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice. "53 
International Shoe did a number of important things. It stated a theory 
of jurisdiction more in sync with the Fourteenth Amendment than did 
Pennoyer. The focus shifted from states ' power to fairness to the 
defendant. 54 It also provided a framework more consonant with modern life 
48 McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957). 
49 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); see also Olberding et al. v. Illinois Cent. 
R. Co., Inc., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953) ("[T]o conclude from [the) holding [in Hess] that the 
motorist, who never consented to anything and whose consent is altogether immaterial, has 
actually agreed to be sued ... is surely to move in the world of Alice in Wonderland."). 
50 Int' l Shoe Co. v. Washington. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
51 /d.at 3 18. 
52 !d. at 319. See also Miliken v. Meyer, 3 11 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) ("The state which 
accords him privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile 
may also exact reciprocal duties"). 
53 lnt'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 3 16. 
54 See Hayward D. Reynolds, The Concept of Jurisdiction: Conflicting Legal ideologies 
and Persistent Formalist Subversion, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 819, 835 (1 991) ("From the 
realist or social-functional perspective, however, International Shoe constructed a new 
paradigm that would better serve the social needs and values of contemporary life and 
business. Under this view, the meaning of International Shoe is to be determined by looking 
beyond words and their dictionary meanings to social, legal, and value contexts. Therefore, the 
formulations of International Shoe's minimum contacts/fair-play standard, and 'contacts, ties, 
or relations ' should not be burdened by territorially loaded concepts or terms. Instead, the 
Court should develop this social-functional standard to serve the needs of our modern federal 
system and allow the states to effectuate their needs through extraterritorial jurisdictional 
216 University of California, Davis [Vol. 21:2 
than did earlier cases and no longer required reliance on the fiction of 
implied consent. Indeed, the jurisdictional reach of state courts was about to 
expand dramatically. Imagine a case in which Neff, a California citizen, 
calls a lawyer, say, named Mitchell, in Oregon and asks Mitchell to perform 
legal services for Neff. When Neff subsequently fails to pay for the legal 
services, as long as Oregon has a statute authorizing service of process on a 
non-resident, Mitchell could properly bring suit in Oregon without violating 
due process. Jurisdiction would be proper even if Neff had never taken a 
step in Oregon. 55 The Court had come a long way since Pennoyer.56 
B. The High Water Mark: McGee v. International Life 
The process of expansion culminated with the Court's decision in 
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.57 There, Lowell Franklin 
purchased a life insurance policy from Empire Insurance. Later, 
International Life assumed Empire's insurance obligations.58 When Franklin 
died, probably by suicide/9 the insurance company refused to pay Lulu 
McGee, his mother and beneficiary under the policy.60 McGee sued in 
actions. The phrase ' contacts, ties, or relations' should be given a functional interpretation not 
limited to activities within the forum or actions outside the forum intentionally causing effects 
in the forum ."); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON 
HALL L. REv. 807, 813 (2004) ("In the mid-twentieth century, International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington reformulated the jurisdictional touchstone from a state's power over those present 
within its territory to an analysis of the fairness or reasonableness of an exercise of jurisdiction 
premised on the defendant 's forum contacts."). 
ss The facts are, of course, those from Pennoyer. But as the Court observed in Burger 
King, a defendant may be subject to the court's jurisdiction even if the defendant never entered 
the state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,476 (1985). 
56 Picking up on International Shoe's implications, in 1962 the Uniform Law 
Commissioners drafted a model long-arm statute that attempted to describe categories of cases 
where the assertion of jurisdiction would comport with due process. Unif. Interstate & Int' l 
Procedure Act, 98 U. L.A. 81 (Supp. 1965) (withdrawn 1977). See also NAT'L CONFERENCE 
OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, 71ST CONFERENCE HANDBOOK OF THE NAT' L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL 
MEETING 219 (1962). While some states adopted the model law, others simply allowed for 
service of process on non-resident defendants as long as the assertion of jurisdiction comports 
with due process; see, e.g., 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-209 (2014) (adopting the model law); N.Y. 
C.L.P.R. 302 (2014) (also adopting the model law); Cal. Civ. Code§ 410.10 (20 14) ("A court 
of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of 
this state or of the United States."); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 14.065 (20 14) ("A court of this state may 
exercise jurisdiction over a party to a civil action on any basis not inconsistent with the 
Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States."). 
57 McGee v. lnt' l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 ( 1957). 
58 /d. at 221. 
59 Death Certificate of Lowell Franklin, Dec. I , 1950 (on file with author). 
60 McGee, 355 U.S. at 222. 
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California, where International Life did not appear.61 After she obtained a 
default judgment, she filed a collection action in Texas, where International 
Life had its principal place of business.62 The Texas courts refused to give 
the California judgment full faith and credit because the California court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 63 
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed in a terse opinion.64 The 
operative facts were few: 
(After International Life assumed Empire' s obligations] 
[r]espondent .. . mailed a reinsurance certificate to Franklin 
in California offering to insure him in accordance with the 
terms of the policy he had with Empire Mutual. He accepted 
this offer and from that time until his death . . . paid 
premiums by mail from his California home to respondent's 
Texas office . . . . It appears that neither Empire nor 
respondent has ever had any office or agent in California. 
And so far as the record before us shows, respondent has 
never solicited or done any insurance business in California 
apart from the policy involved here.65 
Thus, the Court had to determine whether jurisdiction violated due process 
when the only contact with the forum state was a single insurance contract, 
which arguably the defendant had breached by its refusal to pay. 
The Court reviewed the history of personal jurisdiction and recognized 
the "trend [that] is clearly discernible [is] toward expanding the permissible 
scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations."66 The reasons were 
obvious. Commerce had become nationalized, commercial transactions 
could occur through the use of the mails across the continent, and modem 
transportation and communication reduced the burden on a defendant.67 
Justice Black's opinion changed the way in which the Court viewed 
jurisdictional analysis and brought it more in line with due process than did 
Pennoyer. The Court made passing references to the fact that International 
Life solicited Lowell Franklin's business when it sent him the certificate of 
reinsurance.68 Nothing in the opinion suggested that was a necessary 
61 /d. at 221. 
62 Jd. 
63 /d. 
64 Chief Justice Warren took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
65 McGee, 355 U.S. at 221-22. 
66 Jd. at 223. 
67 /d. 
68 !d. at 22 1. There is some irony in the fact that Justice Black authored the opinion. In 
his concurring opinion in International Shoe, Justice Black criticized the due process approach 
taken there that focused on fair play and substantial justice, consistent with his critique of 
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condition. ill fact, the Court's analysis would apply with equal force even if 
Franklin had written illtemational Life to seek renewal of his insurance 
policy. That is so because of the Court's priq~ary emphasis on the minimal 
burden on the defendant in the modem era. 69 Even if the Court found the 
hypothetical case more difficult, it probably would have come to the same 
result. McGee - decided unanimously by the eight Justices hearing the case 
- was an easy case. 70 McGee also focused on an overall assessment of the 
suitability of the forum. It looked to the needs of the plaintiff, convenience 
for witnesses, and the forum state's interest in the litigation.71 
The particular emphasis on the burden to the defendant was more 
consistent with the concept of due process than was Pennoyer's view that 
due process was somehow linked to states' interest in preventing sister states 
from interfering with their sovereignty.72 McGee focused on procedural due 
process: given the level of the burden on the defendant, did the defendant 
have adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard?73 That interpretation of 
due process is consistent with the terms "due process;" that is, did the court 
provide a litigant with procedural faimess?74 It was also consistent with the 
substantive due process. Int' l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 322 (1945) (Black, J., 
concurring). 
69 McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. 
70 /d. at 221. 
71 ld. at 223-2. 
72 Reynolds, supra note 54, at 876-77 (1991) ("While jurists and scholars under the 
influence of the Pennoyer paradigm like to regard McGee as an exceptional case and the high 
water mark under the International Shoe standards, from a social-functional perspective, 
McGee is neither a high nor a low water mark. It is simply a case where the Court properly 
applied the social-functional method in which the forum state's legitimate needs and policy 
concerns are of primary importance, and in which the territorialized concept of defendants ' 
purposeful availment of forum benefits was not the touchstone of extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
A social-functional critique reveals that Pennoyer's progeny - in rem, quasi in rem, transient 
jurisdiction, implied consent, and presence - are all expressions of the forum state's perpetual 
need and interest in exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction to deal with matters of legitimate 
concern. Though these devices have been traditionally viewed as merely exceptions to, or 
minor deviations from the basic territorial principle of Pennoyer, and applied in ways that 
seem to make them consistent with Pennoyer, all these doctrines are evidence of the social 
infirmity of Pennoyer's territorial jurisdiction notion. Pennoyer's jurisdictional progeny were 
social-functional actions. The attempts to rationalize these exceptions with Pennoyer involved 
transparent fictions. The emphasis in these exceptions on things, people, or actions in the 
forum placated only formalist minds."). 
73 McGee, 355 U.S. at 224. 
74 Richard B. Saphire, SpecifYing Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive 
Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. Ill, 113 (1978) ("In its procedural 
aspect, due process has typically been viewed as setting the conditions, if any, which must 
attach to deprivatory governmental action. When operative, these conditions have normally 
been defined in terms of a requirement of some sort of notice and opportunity to be heard prior 
to adverse governmental action."). 
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emerging view of due process during the Warren Court years.75 And again, 
although the Court quoted language from International Shoe to the effect 
that the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, 
McGee did not give special emphasis to the importance of states' 
boundaries. 76 
Some contemporary scholars interpreted McGee as adopting a rule akin 
to choice of law rules.77 Under such an analysis, the balance of several 
factors might weigh in favor of the assertion of jurisdiction even if a 
defendant had not directed business activity towards the forum state. 
Imagine, for example, a case in which a defendant had not directed activity 
to the forum state but where the plaintiff had a strong need for the particular 
forum and the forum state had a compelling interest to hear the case. If the 
burden on the defendant was slight, given the ease of modern 
communication and transportation, jurisdiction over the defendant might not 
offend due process.78 Or one might have thought so. 
C. Hard Cases Make Bad Law with a Vengeance: Hanson v. Denckla 
A Delaware trust company created a trust for Mrs. Donner, a 
Pennsylvania domiciliary.79 Thereafter, she moved to Florida.80 Over the 
next eight years, the trust company maintained the business relationship with 
its client, managing the trust and sending income checks to her in Florida.81 
Once in Florida, Mrs. Donner made a number of decisions involving the 
75 See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969) 
(finding that wage garnishment without hearing violates procedural due process, the court did 
not base its decision on whether a wage earner's interest in said wages was fundamental or 
non-fundamental (substantive due process)); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 ( 1970) 
(discontinuing a welfare recipient's benefits without a prior hearing violated procedural due 
process). 
76 McGee , 355 U.S. at 222. 
77 Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested 
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1148-50 ( 1966) ("These developments have conduced to a 
rethinking of the field 's methodology; they have considerably undermined the traditional 
jurisdictional premise that the plaintiff should seek out the defendant; and they have . . . 
increased the temptations toward parochial choice-of-law thinking ... "). 
78 /d. ("The contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there 
and the insured was a resident of that State when he died. It cannot be denied that California 
has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their 
insurers refuse to pay claims .... When claims were small or moderate individual claimants 
frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum - thus in effect 
making the company judgment proof. Often the crucial witnesses - as here on the company's 
defense of suicide - will be found in the insured's locality."). 
79 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 238 (1958). 
80 !d. at 239. 
81 /d. at 252. 
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distribution of her estate.82 She left the bulk of her estate to two of her 
daughters, Katherine Denckla and Dorothy Stewart.83 Named as re.sidual 
legatees, they were to share an inheritance of about $1,000,000.84 Around 
the same time, Mrs. Donner also exercised the power of appointment under 
the Delaware trust and created two trusts, each in the amount of $200,000 
for the two sons of her third daughter, Elizabeth Hanson.85 Mrs. Donner's 
donative intent seemed obvious: she was dividing her estate roughly into 
three parts, with each daughter or in Elizabeth's case, her children, receiving 
about a third of Mrs. Donner's assets. 
In a story reminiscent of King Lear, two of Mrs. Donner's daughters 
sought to frustrate Mrs. Donner's attempts to divide her assets equally.86 In 
Florida court proceedings to divide Mrs. Donner's assets, Denckla and 
Stewart, the residual legatees, argued that the trust was invalid, resulting in 
the trust assets becoming part of Mrs. Donner's estate and passing to them. 87 
They sought to make the Delaware trust company a party to the suit in 
Florida. 88 While the proceedings were still pending in Florida, Hanson 
brought an action in Delaware to have the trust declared valid.89 The Florida 
court ruled for Denckla and Stewart; the Delaware court ruled for Hanson.90 
The Court faced several difficult issues, including whether the oust 
company was a "necessary and indispensable" party in the Florida 
proceeding,91 whether the case was governed by in rem principles,92 and 
whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause was relevant to the dispute.93 
However, the Court focused on the question of whether personal jurisdiction 
was proper over the trust company in the Florida case.94 
Decided six months after McGee, the case seemed to come within its 
holding.95 The burden on the Delaware trust company seemed minimal, no 
greater than the burden on International Life. The trust company had 
maintained a long business relationship with Mrs. Donner after she moved to 
Florida. Surely Florida and the Florida litigants had an interest in a 
82 !d. at 239. 
83 I d. at 239-40. 




88 ld. at 241. 
89 I d. at 242. 
90 /d. 
91 /d. at 244-45. 
92 Jd. at 245-50. 
93 ld. at 255. 
94 ld. at 250-52. 
95 Jd. at 260 n.4. 
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convenient forum.96 But the effect of applying McGee would have been to 
reward the two sisters who seemed determined to overturn their mother's 
donative intent for their own gain. 
Chief Justice Warren wrote for a narrow majority.97 His opinion made 
clear his view of the two sisters' venality: "[r]esiduary legatees Denckla and 
Stewart, already the recipients of over $500,000 each, urge that the power of 
appointment over the $400,000 appointed to sister Elizabeth's children was 
not 'effectively exercised' and the property should accordingly pass to 
them."98 
Hanson v. Denckla included a number of important points that the 
Court has largely overlooked when it resurfaced in the 1980s. For example, 
the Chief Justice suggested that the claim did not arise out of the contacts 
with the forum state.99 In current terminology, were that the case, 
jurisdiction was not proper under a specific jurisdiction theory. 100 
The Court did not rest there. Instead, it focused on the nature of the trust 
company's contacts with the forum state. Those contacts came about through 
Mrs. Donner's ''unilateral activity."101 As a result, the trust company did not 
purposefull6: avail itself of the benefits of doing business with its customer 
in Florida. 1 2 In what would appear to be a revision of its holding in McGee, 
according to the Chief Justice, McGee turned on the fact that International 
Life "solicited a reinsurance agreement in" the forum state. 103 As discussed 
above, McGee mentioned the fact as one of a number of reasons why 
jurisdiction was proper, but hardly made it a necessary condition for the 
assertion of jurisdiction.104 
As developed below, the Court and lower courts often ignored Hanson 
for over twenty years. 105 No doubt, courts did so for a number of reasons, 
including the obvious result-orientation of the decision. But that would all 
change when the Court began its retrenchment in 1980.106 
96 /d. at 259. 
97 Id. (5-4 decision). 
98 /d. at 240 (emphasis added). 
99 !d. at 25 1. 
100 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 13 1 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
1o1 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. 
102 /d. at 253-54. 
103 /d. at 251 -52. 
104 McGee v. Int' l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 22 1 (1957). See also supra p. 2 18. 
105 See infra Part II.d. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206 ( 1977), for the Court's 
first citation of Hanson. 
106 See infra Part III.b. 
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D. A Look at State Courts 
State judges often favored expanding the jurisdictional reach of their 
courts in the post-McGee era. Finding an explanation for the expansion of 
jurisdiction by the lower courts is not difficult. Relieved from the narrow 
constraints of Pennorer, state courts were eager to protect their citizens from 
out-of-state actors. 10 That populist attitude was summarized by former West 
Virginia Supreme Court Justice Richard Neely in a different context when 
he stated: 
As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-
state companies to injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue 
to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone 
else's money away, but" so is my job security, because the in-
state plaintiffs, their families and their friends will re-elect 
me.108 
Almost certainly, the same sentiment underlies the dramatic expansion of 
states' jurisdictional reach. State courts did so in two notable ways. First, 
even if the state had in place a limited long-arm statute, many state courts 
read those statutes as if they stated, simply, that the state could exercise 
jurisdiction to the full extent of due process. 109 The second way in which 
they expanded jurisdiction was by ignoring Hanson. 110 
The facts of Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitmy Corp. 
demonstrate the latter point. 111 There, Titan Valve, an Ohio corporation, 
manufactured a valve that it shipped to American Radiator in 
Pennsylvania. 112 American Radiator incorporated the valve into a hot water 
heater that it presumably shipped to Illinois. 113 There, the hot water heater 
exploded, injuring the plaintiff, Mrs. Gray .114 The plaintiff joined as co-
107 Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 76 1, 763 (lll. 196 1) . In 
more recent years, business interests have poured millions of dollars into judicial campaigns, 
often resulting in the election of business friendly judges. See Caperton v. A .T. Massey Coal 
Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), for the most egregious example. 
108 RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: How BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED 
FROM THE POLITlCS OF STATE COURTS 4 (1988). 
109 See supra text accompanying notes 66-67. 
110 See infra text accompanying notes 112-122. Not all courts ignored Hanson , but courts 
interested in expanding j urisdiction often did so, especially in cases involving contacts that 
came about via the stream of commerce. Gray is a textbook example where that was the case. 
There, the court cited Hanson, but not for its implications for the purposeful availment aspect 
of the analysis. Instead, it distinguished Hanson as a case where the contact was unrelated to 
the claim for relief. Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 764. 
111 Gray, 176 N.E.2d 76 1. 
112 ld at 762. 
113 ld at 762, 764. 
114 Jd at 762. 
2015] Limiting Access to US. Courts 223 
defendants American Radiator and Titan.115 
Titan moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.116 Had the state 
courts followed Hanson, Titan 's argument that the assertion of jurisdiction 
violated due process would have been strong because Titan did not direct 
any purposeful activity towards the forum state. 117 Instead, it shipped its 
product to Pennsylvania. The valve ended up in the forum through the 
activity of a third party, akin to Mrs. Donner's decision to move to Florida. 
The record was silent on whether any other Titan products ended up in 
Illinois but the court was willing to assume that many Titan valves did so. 118 
The court found that products arriving in the forum through the stream of 
commerce made the assertion of jurisdiction over Titan fair and 
reasonable. 11 9 
The result in Gray makes sense if McGee's view of due process is at 
work: Titan's corporate counsel could hardly claim that the corporation was 
unduly burdened if it had to respond to suit in Illinois. A phone call could 
have secured local counsel; documents required in discovery could have 
been mailed; and if witnesses needed to attend the trial, they could have 
flown or driven on the then-emerging interstate highway system, less than 
400 miles away. 120 And as indicated, the courts that were ignoring Hanson 
would have had good reasons to do so, if they had been forced to articulate 
their reasoning. It looked like a sport in the law, an aberrational decision, not 
entitled to precedential value. 121 
E. In Rem Actions, General Jurisdiction, and Consent 
During the pre-International Shoe era, in rem jurisdiction provided a 
plaintiff some relief from having to travel far from home as long as the 
defendant owned in-state property. 122 As long as the value of the property 
exceeded the plaintiff's claim, in rem jurisdiction filled a need. 123 
Harris v. Balk provides a classic example whereby a plaintiff seeking to 
115 Jd. 
116 ld. 
117 Cf Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). 
118 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. , 176 N.E.2d 76 1, 766 (Ill. 
1961). 
119 Jd. 
120 DISTANCE BETWEEN CITIES, http://www.distancebetweencities.net/il_and_oh/ (last 
visited June 17, 2014). 
121 See discussion supra Part II.d. 
122 Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 8) ("The availability of in rem 
proceedings obviated the need for plaintiffs to bring actions in personam that tested the outer 
limits of general jurisdiction."). 
123 I d. at 7 ("Corporations with assets in a state were subject to general jurisdiction to the 
extent of those assets."). 
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sue an out-of-state defendant could use a property attachment to stay at 
home. 124 There, Balk from North Carolina owed money to Epstein, a 
Maryland resident. 125 Harris, also from North Carolina, owed money to 
Balk.126 Unable to find Balk in Maryland, EJ?stein began his suit by serving 
Harris when he was traveling in Maryland. 1 In effect, he attached the debt 
owed to Balk. 
The theoretical justification for in rem jurisdicti.on would erode as the 
Court moved away from formalism to legal realism. 128 But it was premised 
on the same theory of sovereignty relied on in Pennoyer: the state where the 
property was located bad exclusive jurisdiction over the property within its 
borders. 129 Similarly formalistic, according to the courts, in rem jurisdiction 
was an action against the property, not the owner. 130 Again, apart from the 
questionable foundation for in rem jurisdiction, it provided a gap-filler for a 
plaintiff who was unable fmd an in-state defendant.131 
General jurisdiction, the assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant on a 
claim that does not arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the 
forum state almost certainly has historical roots. As observed by the Court in 
Pennoyer, establishing jurisdiction over a corporation presented the courts a 
distinct query. There, the Court observed that "a State, on creating 
corporations . . . , may provide a mode in which their conduct may be 
investigated, their obligations enforced, or their charters revoked."132 In the 
Pennoyer era, corporations were subject to jurisdiction in their state of 
incorporation. 133 By 1945, when the Court decided International Shoe, 
courts had also held that under some circumstances a corporation was 
subject to personal jurisdiction on a claim unrelated to forum contacts if the 
contacts were sufficiently substantial. 134 
Despite the recognition that sufficient contacts with the forum may 
124 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215,223-24 (1905). 
125 !d. at 22 1. 
126 !d. 
121 !d. 
128 Shaffer v . Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206 (1977). 
129 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,722 (1878). 
130 !d. at 721-22. 
131 Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 6-7) ("Before 1977, U.S. courts 
routinely exercised general jurisdiction under the guise of quasi in rem jurisdiction."). 
132 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735-36. 
133 Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 4 7 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 999, 1004 (2012) ("Jurisdiction over corporations was not as easy or obvious. The 
conceptual difficulty, which preceded Pennoyer, coincided with the law's evolving treatment 
of the corporate structure. In the early nineteenth century, courts considered corporations 
incapable of acting beyond the borders of the state in which they were incorporated. Because a 
corporation could act only in its state of incorporation, jurisdiction was limited to that state."). 
134 lnt' l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 3 18 ( 1945). 
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support )urisdiction in that forum, Supreme Court precedent has been 
sparse. 13 Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Company arose under 
unusual circumstances: the claim arose during World War II based on 
conduct in the Philippine Islands, during Japanese occupation. 136 The 
president of the corporation, who was also the general manager and principal 
shareholder, set up business in Ohio where "he maintained an office in 
which he conducted his personal affairs and did many things on behalf of the 
company."137 Specifically, he maintained the office files; he carried on 
correspondence for the company; he drew checks there for employees and 
carried substantial balances in local banks. 138 An Ohio bank acted as the 
transfer agent for the company. 139 Directors ' meetings were held there. The 
president also supervised policies dealing with property in the Philippines. 140 
The facts presented the majority with an easy case and found that 
jurisdiction was proper. 141 Two Justices dissented on other grounds, dealing 
with the doctrine of independent and adequate state law grounds for a 
decision. 142 
Justice Burton's opinion spoke both broadly and narrowly. For 
example, in framing the issue at the outset, the Court described the relevant 
facts: the corporation was "carrying on a continuous and systematic, but 
limited, part of its general business." 143 In framing its analysis, the Court 
stated, "The essence of the issue here, at the constitutional level, is a like one 
of general fairness to the corporation."144 It concluded that the president of 
the company "carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic supervision of 
the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company."145 
While the Court has decided few feneral jurisdiction cases, 146 plaintiffs 
often rely on general jurisdiction.14 As indicated, courts have upheld 
jurisdiction based solely on the substantial contact that corporate defendants 
have established with the forum state. 148 
135 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011 ). 
136 Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,447-48 ( 1952). 





142 !d. at 449-50. (Minton, J., dissenting). 
143 !d. at 438. 
144 !d. at 445. 
145 /d. at 448. 
146 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (20 I 1 ). 
147 B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 111 1-14 
(1990) (describing ways in which plaintiffs have assetted general jurisdiction). 
148 /d. 
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A plaintiff seeking to sue a corporation could also rely on consent. 149 
Many states have in place legislation that requires corporations to apgoint an 
agent to receive process as a condition of doing business in state. 50 Such 
legislation varies from state to state. Some states limit consent to claims 
arising out of forum activity, 15 1 while others make consent binding for any 
claims against the corporation. 152 
Thus, in the period between 1945 (possibly earlier) and the late 1970s, a 
plaintiff commencing suit could rely on any number of bases for asserting 
jurisdiction. Modem long-arm statutes reached well beyond the borders of 
the state where the plaintiff sought to sue and due process analysis had kept 
abreast. 153 A plaintiff could also rely on more traditional bases of 
jurisdiction, including in rem, general jurisdiction, and consent. 154 But 
I. . b . f 155 1hgants were a out to enter a penod o retrenchment. 
149 Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam 
Jurisdiction of State Courts, from Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 578 
(1957) ("[S]ince a foreign corporation could not carry on business within a state without the 
permission of that state, the state could impose as a condition of engaging in business within 
its borders a requirement that the corporation appoint an agent to receive service of process 
within that state."). 
ISO Brilmayer et al. , supra note 46, at 757 ("The most formidable constitutional issue 
surrounding general jurisdiction by consent arises when consent derives from a statutorily 
required appointment"). 
lSi Jd. at 757 n.I87 ("In some states, statutory consent only applies to suits arising from 
the defendant's fon1m activity. See Dragor Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank Car Co., 361 F.2d 
43, 49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 83 1 (1966); Williams v. Williams, 62 1 S.W.2d 567, 
569-70 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)."). 
1s2 /d. at 757-58. ("Other courts, however, have almost eliminated minimum contacts 
analysis for defendants that have appointed agents. The court in Cowan v. Ford Motor Co. 
summarily concluded that ' by appointing a resident agent and conducting substantial business 
in Mississippi, the defendant has consented to Mississippi's exercise of personal jurisdiction.' 
The opinion fai ls to reveal what those substantial contacts were, preferring simply to state in a 
footnote that 'sufficient contacts indisputably are present. ' Even conclusory assertions of 
connections to the forum are lacking from some opinions that have based general jurisdiction 
wholly on the defendant' s statutory appointment of an agent. In a brief opinion, the court in 
Goldman v. Pre-Fab Transit Co. held that Texas courts could entertain a suit against a foreign 
corporation for property damages suffe red in a truck crash in Louisiana. Noting service on the 
defendant's resident agent, the court explained that ' the rationale behind the theory of consent 
is that in return for the privilege of doing business in the state, and enjoying the same rights 
and privileges as a domestic corporation, the foreign corporation has consented to amenability 
to jurisdiction for purposes of all lawsuits within the state.' The court in Junction Bit & Tool 
Co. v. Institution Mortgage Co. went so far as to say that 'minimum contacts would seem 
patently established' when a 'foreign corporation has actually qualified under Florida law to 
transact business in the state and has appointed a resident agent for service of process' as the 
Florida statute required.") (footnotes omitted). 
ISJ See supra Part li .d. 
154 See supra Part I I.e. 
ISS See discussion infra Part III. 
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III. THE FIRST RETRENCHMENT 
A. The Late 1970s 
The Court's decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson in 
1980 marks the beginning of its retrenchment. One might argue that two 
cases in the late 1970s signaled the Court's intent to narrow jurisdiction. 156 
But neither decision appeared to challenge most liberal efforts to extend the 
. . d. . l h f 157 JUns Jctwna reac o state courts. 
The exgansion of personal jurisdiction was the result of changed 
conditions. 1 These changed conditions also led to the rejection of the 
nineteenth century formalism reflected in Pennoyer. 159 Even before the 
Court addressed the continued vitality of in rem jurisdiction, the Court had 
undercut the rationale for the doctrine. Pennoyer explained the theory 
allowing suit by property attachment as being consistent with the theory 
borrowed from international law that a sovereign has exclusive jurisdiction 
over property within its borders. 160 As discussed above, modem case law 
eroded that theory. 161 In the days of legal formalism, one mi~ht argue that 
the action was against the property, not against the individual.' 2 But that did 
not withstand scrutiny. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
the Court effectively held that the distinction between in rem and in 
personam no longer had significarJce when the question was whether the 
156 Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 
(1977). 
157 See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 8) ("The Court held in Shaffer 
v. Heitner that quasi in rem jurisdiction violated due process in the absence of minimum 
contacts. Justice Marshall required broadly that ' all assertions of state court jurisdiction must 
be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.' But no 
one at that time thought general jurisdiction was limited to a corporation's base of operations, 
and Justice Marshall would have been astonished to learn that his words would one day have 
the effect of eliminating state power over large corporations active in states where they were 
routinely required to answer lawsuits in 1977."). See also Kulko v. Superior of Court of 
California, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (focused on the effect of jurisdiction on family disputes). 
158 McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,222-23 (1957). 
159 See Reynolds, supra note 54, at 824-36 (detailing the changing conditions leading to a 
change in legal theories). 
160 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,729 (1878). 
161 See supra Part II.a; see also David Sloss, Polymorphous Public Law Litigation: The 
Forgotten History of Nineteenth Century Public Law Litigation, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1757, 1761-65 (2014) ("It remains unclear why the [Pennoyer] Court thought it could apply 
international1aw to invalidate a state court judgment ... "). 
162 Michael P. Allen, In Rem Jurisdiction from Pennoyer to Shaffer to the 
Anitcybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, II GEO. MASON L. REV. 243, 255 (2002) ("[A)n 
in rem action traditionally was considered to be formally directed at property, not the 
defendant personally."). 
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notice provided comported with due process. 163 As summarized by the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws, "The phrase, 'judicial 
jurisdiction over a thing' , is a customary elliptical way of referring to 
jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing." 164 
In Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court brought in rem jurisdiction in line with 
in personam jurisdiction. 165 There, the plaintiff brought an action in 
Delaware by attaching shares of stocks owned by some of the directors of 
the Greyhound Corporation.166 The claim arose out of conduct occurring in 
Oregon and the record was silent on other contacts between the defendants 
and Delaware. 167 The Court held that the assertion of jurisdiction on the 
basis of the property attachment, standing alone, violated due process. 168 In 
broadly worded dicta, the Court stated that all assertions of jurisdiction must 
satisfy due process as developed in International Shoe and its progeny. 169 
Shaffer did not seem to presage a retrenchment. As indicated, its 
holding was signaled years earlier in Mullane. 17° Further, in Fuentes v. 
Shevin, the Court had already made pre-judgment attachment of property 
more difficult by requiring some kind of hearing.171 In addition, the need for 
property attachments became less important in light of the movement 
towards liberalized in personam jurisdiction. 172 
The other decision in the late 1970s that might have signaled a 
retrenchment in the Court's ~ersonal jurisdiction case law was Kulka v. 
Superior Court of California. 73 There, the defendant's ex-wife moved to 
California from New York and the defendant acquiesced in his children's 
request to live with their mother in California.174 The defendant's ex-wife 
sued him for child support in a California state court. 175 The majority held 
that the assertion of jurisdiction violated due process, partially relying on 
Hanson. 176 But Kulko did not seem to signal a major movement towards 
163 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 ( 1950). 
164 RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56, INTRODUCTORY NOTE ( 197 1 ). 
165 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206 ( 1977). 
166 /d. at 189-90. 
167 /d. 
168 /d. at 209. 
169 !d. at 207-08. 
170 See supra text accompanying note 164. 
171 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). 
172 Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 8) ("After in rem actions became 
subordinated to due process limits governing actions in personam, courts began to address 
substantive limits on general jurisdiction irrespective of the form of litigation"). 
173 Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
174 !d. at 87-88. 
175 /d. at 88. 
176 /d. at 94. 
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limiting jurisdiction for at least two reasons. First, while the Court did fmd 
that the defendant's contacts did not come about through his purposeful 
conduct, the Court treated that as only one factor. 177 It also considered 
whether the assertion of jurisdiction might be constitutional based on an 
assessment of the effects of his conduct and the reasonableness of the 
assertion of jurisdiction.178 Second, the Court distinguished the facts in 
Kulka from those in cases involving business transactions. 179 Thus, the clear 
suggestion was that Kulko was cabined to domestic relations cases. 180 
B. The 1980s 
1. Specific Jurisdiction 
Harry and Kay Robinson bought an Audi in New York. 181 A year later, 
while they were on their way to Arizona, Harry was driving a moving 
truck. 182 While Kay and their children were driving through Oklahoma in the 
Audi, a drunk driver rear-ended them. 183 The occupants were trapped inside 
the vehicle and severely bumed.184 The plaintiffs brought suit in Oklahoma 
state court where they joined as co-defendants Audi, Volkswagen of 
America, Seaway (the dealer), and World-Wide Volkswagen (the distributor 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 96. As observed by one scholar, Kulka seemed to be an outlier. See Earl M. 
Maltz, Reflections on a Landmark: Shaffer v. Heitner Viewed from a Distance, 1986 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1043, 1064 (1986). 
179 Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97 ("The cause of action herein asserted arises, not from the 
defendant's commercial transactions in interstate commerce, but rather from his personal, 
domestic relations. It thus cannot be said that appellant has sought a commercial benefit from 
solicitation of business from a resident of California that could reasonably render him liable to 
suit in state court; appellant's activities cannot fairly be analogized to an insurer's sending an 
insurance contract and premium notices into the State to an insured resident of the State."). 
180 Duncan E. Barber, Minimum Contacts in Single Contract Cases: Burger King Has Irs 
Way, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 505, 509-10 (1986) ("For example, in McGee v. International Life 
Insurance Co., defendant's solicitation of an insurance contract with a forum resident 
established a substantial connection between defendant and the forum because of the 
defendant's deliberate solicitation within the forum. Jurisdiction was therefore appropriate. 
However, when 'deliberate affiliation' is lacking the Court has been reluctant 
to find jurisdiction. Thus, the Court denied jurisdiction in Kulka v. Superior Court, reasoning 
that defendant's acquiescence to his daughter' s decision to live in the forum could not be 
analogized to seeking 'a commercial benefit from solicitation of business from a resident of 
California."'). 
181 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,288 (1980). 
182 Charles W. Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson - The Rest of the Story, 72 
NEB.L.REV. ll22, 1123(1993). 
l83 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 288. 
184 ld. 
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for New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut). 185 Audi and Volkswagen 
eventually conceded personal jurisdiction,186 but Seaway and World-Wide 
pursued their jurisdictional challenge in the Supreme Court. 187 
Oklahoma seemed like a convenient forum. Even Justice White seemed 
to acknowledge that fact in his majority opinion. 188 He recognized that the 
burden on the defendant, which was the primary focus of the Court 's test, 
"will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant 
factors."189 But the Court did not consider whether the burden on the 
defendants was outweighed by other factors. Instead, relying on Hanson, the 
Court held that a threshold question was whether the defendants had 
purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of OkJahoma.190 
The Court rejected the idea that jurisdiction would be proper even if a 
defendant would suffer no or little inconvenience by litigating in the forum 
because due process would be violated. 191 To so conclude, the Court had to 
find a rationale for why p~oseful contacts with the forum, not the burden 
on the defendant, mattered. 92 Recognizing that the Court had abandoned 
"the shibboleth" of Pennoyer that each state is limited by its territorial 
borders, the Court needed to find a continued justification for the purposeful 
availment aspect of Hanson. 193 While the overall analysis focused on due 
process, the Court has "never accepted the proposition that state lines are 
irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes," nor could the Court do so while 
remaining "faithful to principles of interstate federalism embodied in the 
Constitution."194 Thus, even if all of the factors relied on by the Court in 
McGee favored jurisdiction in the forum state, absent the necessary contacts 
with the forum state, jurisdiction would be improper.195 That was so because 
"the Due Process Clause, act[s] as an instrument of interstate federalism." 196 
Within two years, even Justice White, the author of World-Wide, 
recognized the inadequacy of that theory. 197 Due process does not advance 
185 !d. at 288-29. 
186 !d. at 288 n.3. 
187 /d. at 288. 
188 /d. at 294. 
189 /d. at 292. 
190 /d. at 297. 
191 /d. at 294. 
192 /d. 
193 /d. at 293. 
194 /d. 
195 /d. at 294. 
196 /d. 
197 Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 695 
(1 982). 
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states' interests. 198 Further, were the Due Process Clause a way to protect a 
state's interest, the Court would have to explain why a defendant can waive 
an objection to personal jurisdiction.199 Instead, because the interest would 
seemingly be the state's interest, one would expect that the Court should 
treat the matter as it does subject matter jurisdiction, not subject to waiver by 
h . h . 200 t e parties to t e smt. 
In Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 
Guinee, Justice White confessed error.201 There, he explained that the 
personal jurisdiction requirement "protects an individual liberty interest. It 
represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty."202 
As developed below, once the interstate federalism rationale dropped 
out of the equation, the Court has not offered much of an explanation for 
why contacts with the forum state are a necessary condition for the assertion 
of jurisdiction.203 Attemrots at an explanation seem to fall back on implied 
consent to jurisdiction. 04 Thus, a defendant from Memphis, Tennessee 
cannot be compelled to respond to a suit in West Memphis, Arkansas - a 
short drive across the Mississippi River - but can be compelled to respond 
to a suit almost 400 miles away in Knoxville; Tennessee. Obviously, the 
minimum contacts are not about convenience to the defendant, but are about 
something else altogether. 
World-Wide signaled battle lines within the Court.Z05 Always favoring 
expanded jurisdiction, Justice Brennan dissented in World-Wide. 206 In 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, Justice Brennan would concede that, at a 
minimum, the Constitution requires some minimum contacts.Z07 His World-
198 /d. at 704. 
199 !d. at 703-04. 
200 /d. at 703. 
201 /d. at 701. 
202 !d. at 702. 
203 See infra text accompanying notes 206-13. 
204 Friedrich K. Juenger, Supreme Court Intervention in Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: 
A Dismal Prospect, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 907, 912-13 (1981) (arguing that minimum 
contacts and purposeful availment are simply a "reincarnation of the old implied consent 
fiction.") 
205 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 ( 1980). 
206 /d. at 300; see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 220-29 (I 977) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the majority should not have reached the minimum contacts question, 
but if such analysis is necessary, then finding minimum contacts met for a corporation 
chartered under Delaware law). 
207 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). There, the Court found 
that defendants, businessmen who entered into a franchise agreement with Burger King, a 
Florida corporation, had acted with purpose in the forum state. Id. at 479-82. In such a case, 
only upon a strong showing that the forum was an unreasonable one would a defendant be able 
to avoid that court's jurisdiction. /d. at 482-83, 486-87. In dicta, Justice Brennan suggested 
232 University of California, Davis [Vol. 21:2 
Wide dissent stated in passing that the defendants had contact with the 
forum?08 But most of his dissent focused on modem commerce and on the 
minimal burden on the defendants. For him, a court had to balance all of the 
various factors identified in McGee.209 
The Court did not always adhere to the majority 's insistence that 
contacts had to come about through the defendant's activity purposefully 
directed at the forum, as insisted upon in Justice White's majority opinion in 
World-Wide. For example, in an opinion that at best can be described as 
opaque, Calder v. Jones stated in broad terms that a writer and editor for the 
National Inquirer were subject to jurisdiction in California because they 
knew that their conduct would have an effect in the forum state.210 Other 
parts of the opinion insisted that the defendants targeted the forum state. 211 
Without explanation, the unanimous opinion cited World-Wide as support 
for its discussion of the "effects" felt in the forum state.212 
World-Wide signaled a narrower view of personal jurisdiction than the 
view of many lower courts213 and Justice Brennan? 4 Even without an 
explanation for the necessity of contacts with the forum, World-Wide was in 
place. A court could not merely ask whether the assertion of jurisdiction was 
too burdensome to deprive a defendant of an opportuni~ to defend;215 it had 
to find some threshold of contacts with the forum state. 16 And as discussed 
above, taking the requirement of purposeful activity directed at the forum as 
the necessary minimum could significantly limit the jurisdictional reach of 
state courts.21 7 
Not surprisingly, World-Wide created uncertainty for lower courts? 18 In 
a passing reference to Gray, Justice White seemingly approved its result.219 
The facts before the Court were distinguishable because the stream of 
that upon a lower showing of minimum contacts, i.e., not purposeful activity, jurisdiction 
might be proper when the fairness factors weighed heavily in favor the forum.Jd. at 485-86. 
208 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
209 Jd. at 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
21° Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984). 
211 ld. at789. 
212 Jd. 
213 Mollie A. Murphy, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Theory: A 
Reappraisal and a Revised Approach, 77 KY. L.J. 243, 264-73 (1989) (detailing the limiting 
effect World-Wide had on lower courts' stream of commerce analysis as opposed to the 
expansive analysis followed after Gray). 
214 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J. , dissenting). 
215 !d. at 294 (majority opinion). 
216 ld. 
21 7 See supra pp. 230-232. 
218 Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. , 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987) 
(O'Connor, J, concurring). 
219 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 298. 
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commerce ended in New York when the ultimate consumer purchased the 
vehicle. But applied literally, the Court's test suggested that in a case like 
Gray, a component-parts manufacturer like Titan Valve was not subject to 
jurisdiction because it did not ship its product to or direct other purposeful 
activity to the forum state. 
As a result of the division among lower courts, the Court granted 
certiorari to resolve that issue in Asahi Metal Industry Co. , Ltd. v. Superior 
Court of California.220 There, the plaintiff and his wife were involved in an 
accident when the tire on his motorcycle deflated.221 The plaintiff was 
injured and his wife died.222 He sued a Taiwanese company that 
manufactured the tire.223 The Taiwanese company filed a third party 
complaint against Asahi, thought to be the manufacturer of the valve stem.224 
The original plaintiff settled his case.225 The jurisdictional issue arose 
between the original defendant and the third-party defendant.226 
The Court was unanimous in finding that California could not assert 
jurisdiction over Asahi.227 Ei~ht Justices agreed that the assertion of 
jurisdiction was unreasonable? 8 They focused on the lack of any interest 
that California had in the litigation, the lack of any special need that the 
original defendant had in having the dispute resolved in California, and on 
the significant burden on Asahi in defending the case in California.229 
However, eight Justices believed that the threshold question was the 
sufficiency of contacts with the forum.230 Justice Stevens concurred in the 
result and believed that the case should be resolved by reference only to the 
bl I . 231 reasona eness ana ys1s. 
Because the remaining eight Justices were equally divided on the 
sufficiency of the contacts, Justice Stevens, no doubt pressured by his fellow 
Justices, addressed the sufficiency of the contacts? 32 Justice O'Connor, 
writing for four Justices, held that contacts that come about through 
operation of the stream of commerce without more are insufficient to satisfy 
220 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108 (majority opinion). 
221 !d. 





227 !d. at I 05. 
228 /d. at 114 (majority opinion). 
229 !d. at 114-15. 
230 /d. at 112-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
231 !d. at 121 (Stevens, J. , concurring). 
232 !d. at 122. 
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the contacts part of the Court's test.233 Awareness that the product would end 
up in the forum was not enough.234 Here was Hanson coming back to 
roost.235 Justice Brennan, also writing for four Justices, found the contacts 
sufficient and would so hold as loDf as the product arrived in the forum state 
through the stream of commerce.23 
Justice Stevens would have found that the contacts in the case before 
the Court were sufficient.237 While more tentative than Justice Brennan, he 
stated that in the case before the Court, the contacts were sufficient in light 
of the volume, value and hazard of the product placed in the stream of 
commerce. 
238 
Asahi seemed to resolve little. Although some lower courts relied on 
Justice O'Connor's opinion,239 ignoring the fact that her contacts analysis 
had only four votes, one could hardly state with much confidence what the 
law was. Five Justices endorsed the view that on the facts of the case before 
the Court, the contacts would have been sufficient.240 But line drawing based 
on Justice Stevens' opinion was speculative at best. 
As bad as was the Court's division in Asahi it got worse in the Court's 
last foray into personal jurisdiction between 1990 and 2010. Burnham v. 
Superior Court of California was, according to all nine Justices, an 
extremely easy case.241 Dennis Burnham's family moved to California, 
leaving him residing in New Jersey.242 After a three-day visit to California, 
as he returned one of his children to his wife's home, Burnham was served 
in hand with a court summons and divorce petition.243 At issue was the 
continued vitality of what remained of Pennoyer: was in-hand, in-state 
service of process sufficient to satisfy due process?244 Speaking for four 
233 Jd. at 112 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
234 ld. 
235 /d. at 109. See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("The unilateral 
activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfY the 
requirement of contact with the forum State . .. . (I]t is essential in each case that there be 
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducti ng 
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."). 
236 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121 (1 987) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
237 /d. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
238 /d. 
239 Levi McAllister, Comment, Paddling the Stream of Commerce: The Supreme Court's 
Need to Cautiously Re-Examine One Aspect of Personal Jurisdiction, and the Judicial and 
Financial Consequences Resulting from Current Approaches, 3 HIGH CT. Q. REV. 53, 57-58 
(2007) (citing cases from the First, Sixth, and Fourth Circuits utilizing O'Connor's test). 
240 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
241 Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
242 !d. at 607. 
243 ld. at 608. 
244 Jd. at 610. 
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justices, Justice Scalia said yes?45 He did so based on tradition; in fact, his 
opinion used the term "tradition" or "traditional" thirty-two times?46 Despite 
the agreement that the result was easy, Justice Scalia spent considerable time 
attacking the soundness of Justice Brennan's reasoning in his concurring 
. . "147 
oplillon. 
Also writing for four Justices, Justice Brennan, relying upon dicta from 
Shaffer, insisted that all assertions of jurisdiction must satisfy due process.248 
He found that the defendant's contacts were sufficient to make the assertion 
of jurisdiction reasonable?49 He left open whether one's contact with the 
forum may be too transient to support jurisdiction even if the defendant was 
served in hand?50 
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Asahi offered some limited 
guidance to lower courts. His brief concurring opinion in Burnham offered 
none at all.251 
Asahi and Burnham demonstrated the deep divisions within the Court. 
In both cases, the Court squandered the opportunity to offer much guidance 
to lower courts because of the split in the Court. Some have speculated with 
good reason that the Court did not grant certiorari in a personal jurisdiction 
case until Justice Stevens retired.252 
245 /d. at 607. 
246 !d. at 604. 
247 /d. at 622-28. 
248 /d. at 628-40 (Brennan, J ., concurring). 
249 /d. at 637-38 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
250 /d. at 638-39 (Brennan, J. , concurring). 
251 /d. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring). Cases that would force a court to resolve 
differences between the different opinions in Burnham are unlikely to arise outside of law 
school classrooms. For example, one can envis ion a case where a defendant's presence in-state 
is so transient that Justice Brennan would have found that the assertion of jurisdiction v iolated 
due process. Sources like case books cite one over-flight case where a defendant was served 
when he was flying over the forum-state. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 
1959). Such a case might have forced Justice White to decide whether a defendant not 
intentionally in the forum state was subj ect to jurisdiction based only on transient presence. 
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring). But a look at cases citing Burnham 
suggests that most cases of transient presence raised a different issue: was the defendant 
voluntarily in the state when he was served? See, e.g., Rutherford v. Rutherford, 193 Ariz. 173 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (finding a father was voluntarily in the state when visiting his son); 
Santa Escolastica, Inc. v. Pavlovsky, 736 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Ky. 20 10) (holding that an 
Argentine citizen was properly served and subject to personal jurisdiction in Kentucky because 
he was voluntarily in the state on business). Most law school hypotheticals in which a 
defendant is in state briefly but voluntarily are unrealistic because a plaintiff is highly unlikely 
to be able to anticipate the defendant's brief stay in state without inducing the defendant to 
come into the state (and thereby, implicating the voluntariness question). 
252 Citron, The Last Common Law Justice, supra note 4, at 469 ("Despite - or more 
likely because of - his refusal to provide a fifth vote to any opinion in Asahi or Burnham, the 
236 University of California, Davis [Vol. 21:2 
2. General Jurisdiction 
The Court also took a begrudging view of general jurisdiction during 
the 1980s. Plaintiffs in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall 
were the representatives and survivors of four Americans who died in a 
helicopter crash in Peru.253 They were emR!oyed by a Peruvian alter ego of 
an American company based in Texas? 4 The employer contracted with 
Helicopteros, a Colombian corporation, to rrovide transportation to the 
Peruvian worksite where the crash occurred.2 5 Helicopteros' contacts with 
Texas, where the plaintiffs brought suit, were limited but meaningful.256 The 
chief executive officer of the company negotiated the contract in Texas.257 
The company accepted payments drawn on a Texas bank.Z58 More 
substantially, it sent personnel to Texas for training and, over a period 
spanning several years, it made substantial purchases of equipment there.Z59 
The Court found that the contacts were not continuous and 
systematic.Z60 The defendant did not maintain an office in Texas and it did 
not apply for a license to do business there.261 In reliance on pre-
International Shoe precedent, the Court observed that purchases and related 
trips to the forum do not constitute sufficient contacts with the forum.Z62 
The opinion offered little guidance about where the line existed 
between the kinds of contacts in Perkins where the Court upheld jurisdiction 
and those in Helicopteros, where they were not.263 But the Court did not 
limit general jurisdiction only to a corporation's principal place of business 
or state of incorporation?64 It denied jurisdiction on facts where many lower 
courts would have granted jurisdiction.Z65 Undoubtedly, many lower courts 
Supreme Court did not revisit the doctrinal disputes at issue in those cases until after Stevens 
retired."). 
253 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 409-10 ( 1984). 
254 /d. at 410. 
255 ld 
256 !d. at411. 
257 /d. at 410-11. 
258 !d. at 411. 
259 Jd 
260 !d. at 4 16. 
261 I d. 
262 !d. at4 17. 
263 Rhodes, supra note 54, at 816 ("Instead, there is a qualitative aspect to the analysis as 
well, requiring that the defendant's forum contacts must be ' thought so substantial and of such 
a nature' to support the exercise of general jurisdiction. But a question left unanswered by both 
Perkins and Helicopteros is the type of forum activities that satisfy the qualitative aspect of 
this analysis."). 
264 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16. 
265 George, supra note 14 7, at 11 12 ("[C]ourts have based the assertion of general 
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would have been influenced by the plaintiffs' need for a finding that Texas 
was a proper forum for suit because it was the only plausible venue within 
the United States?66 The alternative was to file the action in a foreign 
country, which almost certainly would provide less favorable law and where 
fact-finders might not have been sympathetic to foreign nationals?67 
One problem with the Court's general jurisdiction case law was the lack 
of an explanation of the underlying theory making general jurisdiction 
appropriate. As in Perkins, the Court was silent on the underlying theory for 
why general jurisdiction was appropriate?68 The Court might have explained 
Perkins as a case of jurisdiction by necessity; if suit were not proper in Ohio, 
the plaintiff would have had no practical venue in which to bring suit.269 But 
in neither Perkins nor Helicopteros did the Court attempt to explain Perkins 
on such a narrow ground.270 As such, general jurisdiction would be a limited 
safety valve. But the Court has had opportunities to limit Perkins to its facts 
but has never done so. In addition, the Court did not discuss the relative 
convenience or burdens faced by the parties.271 In both cases, the Court has 
jurisdiction on a history of regular business activities. An Illinois court in Huffman v. Inland 
Oil & Transport Co. considered the availability of jurisdiction in a suit brought by a Missouri 
resident against a Missouri corporation involving an injury that occurred in Alabama. 
Jurisdiction was found based on evidence that the defendant had regularly sailed its vessels on 
Illinois waters for a six-month period."). 
266 Louise Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, 58 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 913, 916 (1985) ("Among the facts that should have had bearing was that the 
alternative forum for the Helicopteros plaintiffs would not have been some other state. Helical 
was amenable to suit in no state if not in Texas; the alternative would have been a foreign 
country."). 
267 /d. at 933-34 (Discussing the difficulties presented by trying a tort case in a foreign 
country like Peru, including a lack of sympathy for claims of actual damages similar to those a 
tort plaintiff would claim in the United States, damages being awarded in local currencies, the 
unavailability of contingency fee arrangements, and the possibility of being required to pay the 
winning party's attorney's fees). 
268 1/elicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 
(1952). See also Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REv. 610, 
641 ( 1988) ("As in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., the Court's general 
jurisdiction analysis consisted of a catalogue of the defendant's contacts with the forum, which 
culminated in a finding that they were insufficient to support general jurisdiction. The Court's 
rationale offered no new insight into general jutisdiction theory or the range of contacts that 
might support general jurisdiction. Instead, it merely found that Helical's commercial contacts 
with the forum- although arguably 'continuous,' 'systematic,' and 'substantial' - could not 
support general jurisdiction."). 
269 Perkins, 342 U.S. 437. See also, Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Patrick J. Borchers, The 
Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 124 (2001) ("[T]he lack of 
any alternative forum might make Perkins a case of jurisdiction by necessity, rather than a 
clear example of contacts-based general jurisdiction."). 
270 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Perkins, 342 U.S. 437. 
271 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Perkins, 342 U.S. 437. 
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focused on the continuous and systematic nature of the defendants ' contacts 
with the forum: in Perkins they were substantial,272 in Helicopteros they 
273 1 h were not. Left open was whether contacts alone - or contacts p us t e 
additional fairness factors that develofed in specific jurisdiction cases -
applied to general jurisdiction analysis. 74 
Scholars have debated various rationales for general jurisdiction.275 But 
even among scholars, no theory has emerged as a coherent explanation for 
general jurisdiction.276 For example, Professor Twitchell identified the 
origins of general jurisdiction in history when jurisdiction was based on 
sovereign power, consent or allegiance?77 At that time, courts did not 
consider the relationship of the suit to the defendant's cond"E.ct in the 
forum.278 Thus, in the pre-International Shoe era, general jurisdiction may 
have been an important doctrine to assure a plaintiff a forum against a 
corporation in a jurisdiction other than the corporation's state of 
incorporation.279 But with the expansion of specific jurisdiction in the 
modern era, according to Professor Twitchell, the need for general 
jurisdiction has diminished.280 She argued that it should be reserved for "its 
most essential function: providing one forum where a defendant may always 
be sued."281 Twitchell argued in favor of retention of general jurisdiction 
even with the modern expansion of specific jurisdiction. But she urged a 
272 Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447. 
273 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418-19. 
274 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 765-66 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
("As the majority points out, all of the cases in which we have applied the reasonableness 
prong have involved specific as opposed to general jurisdiction. Whether the reasonableness 
prong should apply in the general jurisdiction context is therefore a question we have never 
decided, and it is one on which I can appreciate the arguments on both sides."). 
275 See generally Michael H. HofTheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549 (2012) (discussing general 
jurisdiction as providing a gap filling function); Brilmayer, Haverkamp & Logan, supra note 
46 (identifying four justifications for general jurisdiction; convenience for the defendant, 
convenience for the plaintiff, to ensure the power of states, and the quid pro quo theory of 
general jurisdiction); Cornett & HofTheimer, supra note 9 (arguing that general jurisdiction 
gives traditional power to the states to require non-resident corporations to appear in their 
courts); Twitchell, supra note 268 (arguing that general jurisdiction should be limited to its 
essential function of ensuring that there is at least one location where a defendant can be sued). 
276 Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST L. 
REv. 999, 1012 (2012) ("The Court rarely has addressed the particular policies underlying 
general jurisdiction, and this silence has caused academic commentators and courts to propose 
various theories and applications of general jurisdiction."). 
277 Twitchell, supra note 268, at 614. 
278 !d. at 621. 
2~ /d. at622,669. 
280 !d. at 622-30. 
281 !d. at 667. 
2015] Limiting Access to U.S. Courts 239 
much narrower view of its availability, basicall~ to where it had its principal 
place of business or state of incorporation. 82 Her test would provide 
d. b.l. 283 pre tcta 1 1ty. 
Professor Lea Brilmayer identified four justifications for general 
jurisdiction.Z84 The first was convenience for the defendant.285 The rationale 
parallels the Court's holding that a natural person's state of residence is a 
proper forum.286 A second justification is convenience to the plaintiff.287 
Third is, on the basis of gower, a state must be able to "compel the 
appearance of defendants"2 in order to adjudicate the rights of a party. 
This essentially equates to the state border concept of Pennoyer.289 Critical 
of the first three justifications, Professor Brilmayer found the "most 
satisfactory basis" for general jurisdiction to be the quid pro quo theory 
between a state and its domiciliaries.290 Having sufficient contacts with the 
forum state gives the defendant a stake in the political process: "the basic 
inquiry must be whether the defendant's level of activity rises to the level of 
activity of an insider, so that relegating the defendant to the political 
processes is fair."291 Although she wrote about general jurisdiction long 
before recent Court cases extending the right of corporations to give political 
contributions,292 her theory would seemingly have increasing relevance 
today. That would be so even though a corporation cannot vote. In addition 
to a corporation's power to influence politics through monetary 
contributions, the numerous employees living in the forum state vote and, 
presumably, represent the interests of their employer. 293 
282 !d. at 668-71. 
283 /d. at 669. 
284 Brilmayer, Haverkamp & Logan, supra note 46, at 730. 
285 ld. 
286 !d. 
287 ld. at 730-31. 
288 /d. at 73 1. 
289 Jd. at 73 1-32. 
290 /d. at 732-33. 
291 /d. at 742. 
292 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. Fed. 
Election Comm' n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
293 See Brendan Fischer, On NFIB Conference Call, Romney Urges Employers to Tell 
Employees How to Vote, Just Like the Kochs , COMMON DREAMS (Oct. 18, 2012), 
http://www .commondreams.org/view/20 12/10118-5 (Presidential candidate Mitt Romney 
encouraged business owners to tell their employees how to vote: " I hope you make it very 
clear to your employees what you believe is in the best interest of your enterprise and therefore 
their job and their future in the upcoming elections. And whether you agree with me or you 
agree with President Obama, or whatever your political view, I hope - 1 hope you pass those 
along to your employees. Nothing illegal about you talking to your employees about what you 
believe is best for the business, because I think that will figure into their election decision, 
240 University of California, Davis [Vol. 21:2 
Professor Brilmayer's approach would be more consonant with more 
liberal theories of general jurisdiction?94 For example, the presence of many 
Walmart stores in a state would provide Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. with political 
clout and should therefore justify the assertion of jurisdiction even in cases 
unrelated to the forum contacts.295 Limiting general jurisdiction to the state 
of incorporation and principal place of business creates greater certainty but 
ignores the fact that a corporation may gain extraordinary benefits from the 
forum state even if that is not its principal place ofbusiness?96 
Many lower courts adopted broad interpretations of general 
jurisdiction.297 They often have done so to provide the plaintiff, often a state 
resident, a convenient place to sue. Some courts, for example, have held that 
general jurisdiction was proper only upon a showing of systematic and 
continuous contacts with the forum, allowing suit, for example, against large 
corporations in almost any state in the United States?98 That view often 
allows creative forum-shopping to assure favorable law applies to the 
their voting decision and of course doing that with your family and your kids as well. "). 
294 Roy L. Brooks, The Essential Purpose and Analytical Structure of Personal 
Jurisdiction Law, 27 IND. L. REv. 361, 375 (1993). Others are comfortable with a 
more liberal application of the doctrine. See Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal 
Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1444 (1988) (positing that general jurisdiction exists for 
companies and corporations that have a large presence in a state). 
295 Brilmayer, Haverkamp & Logan, supra note 46, at 742 (indicating that the systematic 
activity of a defendant within a forum, "such as domicile, incorporation, or doing business, 
suggests that the person or corporate entity is enough of an 'insider' that he may safely be 
relegated to the State's political process."). 
296 In the 20 13 fiscal year, Walmart U.S. net sales reached $274.5 billion. Walmart 2013 
Annual Report 5, http://c46b2bcc0db5865f5a76-91 c2ff8eba65983al c33d367b8503d02.r78.cf2 
.rackcdn.corn/88/2dl 4fdf67184a359fdef07b I c3f4732/20 13-annual-report-for-walmart-stores-
inc_ 130221024708579502.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). Walmart operated 4005 Walmart 
stores in the United States in fiscal 2013, with 217 of those stores in Califomia./d. at 59. The 
estimated average net sales per store was $70 million and the net sales in California alone is 
estimated at $ 15,190,000. Jd. at 5, 59. 
297 Rhodes, supra note 54, at 830-55 (detailing some of the many approaches lower courts 
have taken to general jurisdiction including the Ipse Dixit approach, precedential comparisons, 
factor analysis, central business activities, and quid pro quo). 
298 ld. at 830 nn.l l8-21 (Citing cases in Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, and Texas where 
the courts simply concluded there was jurisdiction based on a limited showing of continuous 
and systematic contacts); see, e.g. , Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc. v. G & G Auto Sales, Inc., 512 
So. 2d 1334, 1334-36 (Ala. 1987) (holding that nonresident corporation 's repeated wholesale 
auction sales of automobiles to dealers in Alabama, including the automobile at issue in the 
underlying lawsuit, was purposefully directed forum activity that constituted a "'continuous 
and systematic ' course of conduct in Alabama" supporting jurisdiction); Waters v. Deutz 
Corp., 479 A.2d 273,274-76 (Del. 1984) (holding German corporation was "doing business" 
in Delaware by shipping its manufactured tractors, including the tractor injuring the Delaware 
plaintiff, through its wholly owned American subsidiary into Delaware). 
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plaintiffs suit.299 And while courts may be influenced in how broadly they 
read general jurisdiction precedent by their views of forum-shopping,300 
little in the theoretical underpinnings of general jurisdiction explains why a 
plaintiffs successful forum-shopping is relevant to the breadth of general 
jurisdiction. 
C. Summary of the 1980s 
The 1980s did more than demonstrate deep divisions within the 
Court.301 In some instances, like Calder v. Jones, the Court upheld 
jurisdiction. 302 But some ominous themes emerged. 
Despite upholding jurisdiction in Burnham, the conservatives on the 
Court demonstrated a desire to limit jurisdiction in other cases.303 The notion 
that jurisdiction turned on convenience was at risk. Instead, in reliance on 
Hanson, the conservative wing of the Court was trying to develop a narrow 
theory of jurisdiction. 304 
Entering the 1980s, one could have argued that McGee's due process 
299 Even though the defendant did not raise a personal jurisdictional challenge, the facts of 
Ferens v. John Deere suggest the forum-shopping potential of the liberal view of general 
jurisdiction. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990). There, the plaintiff was injured 
when he was using a John Deere combine in Pennsylvania where he lived. Id. at 519. He 
waited to contact a lawyer until after the statute of limitations had run on his tort claim. Court 
Reinstates Suit of Pa. Farmer, Observer-Reporter (Washington, Pa.), Mar 6, 1990 at A-5 . To 
revive the tort claim, the plaintiff's lawyer filed the action in Mississippi. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 
519. Under Mississippi conflict of law rules, its longer statute of limitations applied to the 
plaintiff's tort claim. !d. at 519-20. The issue before the Court in Ferens was whether, when 
the plaintiff sought a transfer of venue to Pennsylvania, Mississippi's choice of law rules 
traveled with the suit. !d. at 520. The Court held that they did.ld. at 532. 
300 See, e.g., Hoffheimer, supra note 275, at 609. ("The consensus of the Supreme Court in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires conceals important areas of divergence with immediate practical 
consequences. On the one hand, the opinion can be read narrowly as affirming the exclusive 
classification of cases into specific and general jurisdiction and disallowing general 
jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers based solely on sporadic sales through intermediaries. 
On the other hand, it can be read broadly as effectively ending general jurisdiction over 
nonresident corporations by restricting general jurisdiction to corporations that incorporate 
under the laws of the state, maintain their principal place of business in the state, or have such 
a comparably close connection with the state so that they are 'at home' in the state."). 
301 See discussion supra Part III.b. 
302 See supra text accompanying note 211. 
303 See supra pp. 14-15. 
304 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In World-Wide, the Court 
found that the contacts part of the due process analysis was related to interstate federalism. !d. 
at 292. While it attempted to distance it.~clf from the "shibboleth" of Pennoyer (the idea that 
the Fourteenth Amendment protected states' rights), the concept that state borders still matter 
is rooted in Pennoyer's reliance on principles of international law. See id. at 293-94; see also 
Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,729-30 (1878). 
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analysis was the dominant theme. At that time, procedural due process 
meant that a defendant could be hauled into court as long as the forum 
provided the defendant with adequate notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.305 Consistent with McGee, a court needed to determine the extent of 
the burden on the defendant in light of other competing needs, including 
those of the plaintiff. 306 The ease of travel and communications made state 
borders less important in a modem society.307 As argued above, that is a 
coherent theory of the relevance of due process to the jurisdictional 
1 . 308 ana ys1s. 
But Pennoyer's questionable theo~ of federalism still lurked in the 
Supreme Court at the end of the 1980s. 3 That is, state borders still mattered 
- even thou~h the Court failed to offer a compelling explanation for why 
that was so. 1° Further, Hanson's flawed analysis was now front and 
center? " A result-oriented decision, motivated by an understandable desire 
to avoid a gross injustice, now reemerged as important precedent.312 Lost in 
its reemergence were the facts that it was not only result-oriented but it was 
also decided by a slim majority.313 Further, the Court now cited its approach 
to the contacts part of the due process test as a threshold question to the 
assessment of reasonableness, despite the fact that Hanson did not engage in 
such a two-step analpis.314 The Court ignored ways in which Hanson could 
have been narrowed. 15 
Finally, although it occurred in the 1970s and not the 1980s, the Court' s 
new in rem jurisprudence - conflating in rem and in personam due process 
analysis - would have unexpected ramifications in the future.316 At the 
305 See discussion supra Part II. d. 
306 See supra p. 217. 
307 !d. 
308 Jd. 
309 See supra pp. 231 . 
310 /d. 
311 The Court could have focused on Hanson's conclusion that the defendant's contacts 
with Florida were unrelated to the claim. ft might have emphasized the unusual nature of the 
facts, suggesting that Hanson should not be the major premise of due process analysis, but 
instead, that McGee should have. Instead, World-Wide was a full-throated endorsement of a 
broad reading of Hanson. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,294 (1980). 
312 See supra pp. 21 9-222. 
313 See generally World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286 (omitting any discussion of the flaws in 
Hanson). 
314 See generally Hanson v. Denck1a, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (finding no contacts despite 
continued payments and correspondence between the decedent and the Delaware trust 
company, the Court did not analyze the reasonableness of allowing jurisdiction). 
315 See generally World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286 {applying Hanson without discussion of 
limiting it to its facts because it was a result-oriented decision). 
316 See generally Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (applying the International Shoe 
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time, Helicopteros' implications may not have been obvious. On its face, the 
decision indicated that purchases, even if substantial, did not amount to 
continuous and systematic contacts that could justify an assertion of general 
jurisdiction.317 But as Professors Cornett and Hoffheimer have argued, 
narrowing in rem jurisdiction made more important the use of general 
jurisdiction. 318 Thus, prior to Shaffer, plaintiffs could have commenced suit 
by attaching property even if it had no relationship to the underlying 
dispute.319 After Shaffer, plaintiffs gained little by attaching property -
without satisfying International Shoe, the assertion of in rem jurisdiction 
violated due process. In such cases, plaintiffs might need to rely on general 
jurisdiction; but retrenchment in general jurisdiction meant that those 
plaintiffs would no longer be able to file suit in a plaintiff-friendly venue. 
Again, as Professor Hoffheimer has pointed out, as Shaffer's author, Justice 
Marshall would no doubt be surprised at the effect of the Court's decision.320 
But the full effects of Shaffer are coming into focus only now. That is part of 
the rest of the story.321 
IV. THE REEMERGENCE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
A. Modern Developments 
Between 1990 and 2010, a lot changed in the world. The Internet 
created a globalized market and made information available around the 
minimum contacts test to in rem cases as well as in personam cases). 
317 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 41 7 (1984). 
318 Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 8) ("After in rem actions became 
subordinated to due process limits governing actions in personam, courts began to address 
substantive limits on general jurisdiction irrespective of the fo rm of litigation. The Court held 
in Shaffer v. Heitner that quasi in rem jurisdiction violated due process in the absence of 
minimum contacts. Justice Marshall required broadly that 'all assertions of state court 
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its 
progeny.' But no one at that time thought general jurisdiction was limited to a corporation's 
base of operations, and Justice Marshall would have been astonished to learn that his words 
would one day have the effect of eliminating state power over large corporations active in 
states where they were routinely required to answer lawsuits in 1977." (quoting Shaffer, 433 
U.S. at 212)). 
319 See supra pp. 224. 
320 Hoffheimer, supra note 275, at 549 ("This holding did not alter the reach of in rem 
jurisdiction when the legal claims related to attached property, but it meant that so-called quasi 
in rem jurisdiction was no longer permissible when the defendant had no ties in the state and 
when the claims in litigation were unrelated to the property that had been seized to secure 
jurisdiction. In other words, Shaffer restricted the permissible scope of quasi in rem 
jurisdiction to the scope of specific jurisdiction."). 
321 See infra text accompanying note 606. 
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world in an instant.322 Trade agreements opened borders around the world, 
making international transactions increasingly common.323 Without 
Supreme Court guidance, lower courts had to make do with the Court's 
earlier divided precedent.324 
Many courts have addressed, with differing results, the way in which 
contacts analysis works in Internet cases. 325 Lower courts faced cases where 
defendants caused harm by circulating false information over the Internet,326 
322 See, e.g., J. Mcintyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780,2791 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) ("[T]here have been many recent changes in commerce and communication, many 
of which are not anticipated by our precedents."); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 
1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996) (calling the Internet and its impact on commerce "perhaps the latest 
and greatest .. . historical, globe-shrinking trend"); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 
952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (W.O. Pa. 1997) (stating that the Internet "makes it possible to 
conduct business throughout the world entirely from a desktop"). 
323 Veronica Hernandez, Comment, J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 
2780 (2011): Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Doctrine, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 
431, 433 (noting that " the globalization of commerce over the past 50 years presents a 
dramatic shift in American society" and that "the abandonment of a manufacturing-based 
economy in the late twentieth century has resulted in the explosive growth in foreign goods, 
which necessitates ... enabl[ing] states to provide redress to their citizens for injuries caused 
by defective goods manufactured abroad"); see also THOMAS A. DICKERSON, LITIGATING 
INTERNATIONAL TORTS [N U.S. COURTS § I: I (2013) ("As the world 's economy becomes 
more integrated, products and services move with increasing frequency across national borders 
.. . American courts and lawyers wrestle with .. . [p]roviding redress when foreign products 
cause harm in the U.S."). These changes came at the same time as tort reform and other 
changes like statutes of repose that made choice of forum more crucial than ever. See HENRY 
COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32560, SELECTED PRODUCTS LIABILITY ISSUES: A 
FIFTY-STATE SURVEY 20-23 (2005), available at https ://stuff.mit.edulafs/sipb.mit.edulcontrib/ 
wikileaks-crs/wikileaks-crs-reports/RL32560.pdf (listing statutes of repose in all fifty state); 
see also The Effects of Tort Reform: Evidence from the States, Congress of the United States 
Congressional Budget Office, (June 2004), available at http ://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/ 
files/report _2.pdf (discussing the prevalence of tort reform since the mid-1980s ). 
324 See, e.g., Zippo, 952 F. Supp. 1119 (establishing the "sliding scale" Internet 
jurisdiction test that considers the level of interactivity or passivity of a defendant's website 
rather than purposeful availment); CompuServe, 89 F.3d 1257 (holding that the defendant 
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing business in the forum state, despite 
never having traveled there, by creating an ongoing marketing relationship with the plaintiff 
corporation headquartered in the forum); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc ., 130 F.3d 4 14 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (surveying approaches adopted by other courts, including the Zippo test, as well as 
tests that examine the number of "hits" a website receives and other evidence that the Internet 
activity was directed at the forum state). 
325 See Patrick J. Borchers, J. Mcintyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the 
Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1267 (2011) (noting that lower courts 
have "divided sharply" regarding personal jurisdiction in Internet cases). 
326 See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467,471 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that an allegedly 
defamatory article about the plaintiff posted online by the defendant did not constitute a 
substantial enough contact to establish personal jurisdiction, since the article targeted the 
plaintiff and not the forum). 
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engaging in deceptive business practices, or violating the intellectual 
property rights of in-state citizens from remote locations.327 In response, 
many courts extended their state' s jurisdictional reach.328 Often, they 
ignored the teachings of cases like World-Wide and Hanson that required a 
demonstration of purposeful activity directed at the forum.329 Instead, they 
relied on Calder, which required knowledge that the harm would take place 
in the forum. 330 
After Asahi, courts continued to struggle with the anal~sis when a 
product was swept into the forum via the stream of commerce. 31 But many 
courts relied on the stream of commerce theory to extend jurisdiction.332 
They did so by applying some mix of Justice Brennan's liberal test and 
Justice Stevens' narrower test in Asahi or by relying on dicta from World-
Wide in which Justice White cited Gray with approval.333 Again, that 
seemed consonant with the two themes developed above: modem commerce 
has increased instances in which out-of-state companies may create in-state 
harm, and a court can uphold jurisdiction as long as the defendant has a 
reasonable opportunity to be heard?34 That is, due process is not offended if 
the burden on the defendant is not ovetwhelming. 33 
327 See, e.g., Fenn v. Mleads Enterprises, Inc., 137 P.3d 706 (Utah 2006) (adopting a 
version of the Zippo "sliding scale" test, but holding that a single unsolicited e-mail 
advertisement sent to the forum state by the defendant was not a significant enough contact to 
render jurisdiction proper); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (holding that defendant's mere creation of a website in another state, although viewable 
in the forum state, did not render defendant amenable to suit in the forum state for allegedly 
infringing on plaintiff's trademark). 
328 See, e.g., Inset Systems, Inc., v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996) 
(exercising jurisdiction over a defendant whose website could have been viewed in the forum 
state, whether or not it actually was). 
329 See, e.g., Yerizon Online Services, Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d. 601,618-19 (E.D. 
Va. 2002) (finding jurisdiction proper where defendants allegedly sent millions of e-mails 
through plaintiff's servers in the forum state, even though defendants did not know where 
plaintiff's servers were located. "By allegedly transmitting millions of e-mails to make money 
at Yerizon's expense, knowing or reasonably knowing that such conduct would harm 
Yerizon's e-mail servers, Defendants should have expected to get dragged into court where 
their actions caused the greatest injury."). 
330 Jd at 614 ("In tort cases involving Web sites, some courts have ... applied the 'effects 
test' set forth in Calder."). 
331 J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (acknowledging 
that lower courts were struggling with "decades-old questions left open in Asahi."). 
332 See Hernandez, supra note 323, at 438 ("The deep split and narrow holding in Asahi 
left state courts great latitude in finding minimum contacts through the stream-of-commerce 
theory when analyzing the contacts prong of the World-Wide Volkswagen test."). 
333 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980). 
334 See supra pp. 217-218, 242. 
335 See supra pp. 217-218. 
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General jurisdiction remained an available option as well. Many courts 
took a liberal view of general jurisdiction?36 For example, the Ninth Circuit 
found that jurisdiction over L.L. Bean was proper, despite the absence of any 
physical assets in the forum. state.337 Again, while not all courts joined the 
trend, many courts continued the trend towards extending the jurisdictional 
reach of their courts. But as with the trend towards liberalization culminating 
in the 1970s, the Court seems to be in the process of a second retrenchment. 
B. The Recent Cases: A Quick Overview 
With Justice Stevens' retirement, the Court quickly granted certiorari in 
two personal jurisdiction cases.338 Three years later, the Court again granted 
the writ in two more personal jurisdiction cases.339 This section provides an 
overview of those decisions. 
1. Easy Cases Make Bad Law: General Jurisdiction 
1. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown 
The parents of two boys who died in a bus accident near Paris sued 
Goodyear USA and three foreign subsidiaries in state court in North 
Carolina.340 Goodyear USA, which had plants in North Carolina, did not 
contest the court's jurisdiction but the three foreign companies did? 4 1 
The state court of appeals recognized that the claim did not arise out of 
any contact with the forum because the accident took place in France and the 
tire that caused the wreck was manufactured abroad.342 But it found that 
some tires manufactured by the foreign subsidiaries arrived in North 
n6 See RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY C. PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, 
MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 102 (6th ed. 2012) (discussing cases in which courts exercised 
general jurisdiction based on limited contacts with the forum state). 
337 Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated en bane, 
366 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2004). 
338 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (201 1); J. 
Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2796 (20 II ). Justice Stevens had been 
viewed as having prevented the Court from gathering a majority of votes previously. See. e.g., 
Citron, The Case of the Retired Justice, supra note 4, at 644 ("After [Justice Stevens] retired in 
2010 and was replaced by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court apparently saw an opportunity to 
resolve the conflict ... Stevens could have determined the legal standard in Asahi by voting 
with either Justice Brennan or Justice O'Connor."). 
339 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 111 5 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 
(2014). 
340 Goodyear, 13 1 S. Ct. at 2850. 
341 /d. 
342 /d. at 2851 (citing Brown v. Meter, 199 N.C. App. 50, 57-58 (2009)). 
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Carolina through the stream of commerce.343 The contacts that resulted were 
sufficient to satisfy due process.344 A unanimous Supreme Court 
di d 345 sagree . 
As observed by the Court, it has seldom addressed general 
jurisdiction.346 But it did little to elucidate its test in this case.347 The primary 
fault of the lower court seemed to be the reliance on the stream of commerce 
theory in a general jurisdiction case. As the Court put it, "The North 
Carolina court's stream-of-commerce analysis elided the essential difference 
between case-specific and all-purpose (general) jurisdiction."348 The primary 
discussion was short, consisting of a description of its holdings in Perkins 
and Helicopteros and the conclusion that the defendants' contacts with 
North Carolina fell short of the line because, as in Helicopteros, they were 
not continuous and systematic. 349 Had the Court ended there, the decision 
would have presaged no radical change in the law.350 
But Justice Ginsberg went further. She quoted Professor Brilmayer's 
view that general jurisdiction over a corporation is akin to finding domicile 
for an individual - a place where the corporation is "fairly regarded as at 
home."351 In a parenthetical, she indicated that the "paradigm" where a 
corporation would be at home is in the state of incorporation or in the state 
where it has its principal place of business.352 In concluding, she observed 
that the foreign subsidiaries "are in no sense at home in North Carolina."353 
The insertion of "at home" into the opinion divided commentators?54 
343 !d. (citing Brown v. Meter, 199 N.C. App. 50,57-58 (2009)). 
344 !d. 
345 /d. See also Hoffheimer, supra note 275 (discussing the Court's holding and its 
potential implications). 
l46 G~odyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854. 
347 Hoftheimer, supra note 275, at 55 1 (noting that Goodyear failed to achieve its goal of 
providing guidance to lower courts, since "it can be read in radically different ways."). 
348 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2855. 
349 !d. at 2856-57. 
350 See Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of "Essentially at Home" in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 
S.C. L. REV. 527, 527-28 (2012) (noting that Goodyear could have been easily resolved under 
existing precedent, and that the Court did not need to go further). 
351 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54. 
352 !d. at 2854. 
353 /d. at 2857. 
354 See, e.g., Hoffheimer, supra note 275, at 551-52 (observing that Goodyear can be 
interpreted as "approv[ing] general jurisdiction in multiple states where a foreign corporation 
has strong permanent connections," while "equally support[ing] a restrictive approach that 
limits general jurisdiction to the place of incorporation and the ... Principal place of 
business"); Stein, supra note 350, at 547 (arguing that general jurisdiction over a corporation 
should not necessarily be limited to its principal place of business, but also in any jurisdiction 
where it is sufficiently "invested" and has "insider status"). 
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Some saw the opinion as limiting general jurisdiction to those two venues.355 
Others pointed out that, had the Court intended to limit general jurisdiction 
in that manner, it could have stated such a rule unequivocally.35 As stated, 
those two venues were "paradiWOs," not exclusive places where general 
jurisdiction would be permitted.3 7 
Justice Ginsburg made no effort to explain the theoretical 
underpinnings of general jurisdiction.358 Her analogy to domicile is 
intriguing, but not particularly helpful. Pennoyer recognized domicile as a 
basis of the assertion of jurisdiction. 359 At that time, the explanation would 
have been that a person within the state's borders is within the court's 
exclusive jurisdiction, just as was property.360 Once the Court moved away 
from formalism, the Court explained that a person 's domicile is a suitable 
place for suit against the defendant because he or she derives benefits from 
residing in the state.361 In Burnham, when the Court returned to the rule that 
a non-resident is subject to jurisdiction in a state when served in hand, in 
state, Justice Scalia relied on tradition as a sufficient justification for 
adherence to the rule.362 Even Justice Brennan's concurring opinion 
indicated that, in an expanded International Shoe analysis, the historic rule 
upholding in-hand service put a defendant on notice that he was subject to a 
court's jurisdiction. 363 
As a matter of tradition, state of incorporation was a proper place to sue 
a corporation by analogy to dornicile.364 The Court needed some place where 
355 See James R. Pielemeier, Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome Refinement of the Language 
of General Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 969 (2012) (arguing that 
Goodyear clarifies and limits general jurisdiction to where a defendant is "at home" only). 
356 See Hoffheimer, supra note 275, at 590-92. 
357 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854; Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014). 
358 Hoffheimer, supra note 275, at 551 ("The opinion avoided dissension by omitting any 
discussion of the theoretical bases of jurisdiction and by withholding any examples of 
'substantial ' or 'systematic and continuous' activity."). 
359 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1878). 
360 !d. at 722 ("[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over person 
and property within its territory."). 
361 Miliken v. Meyer, 31 I U.S. 457, 463 (1940) ("The state which accords [one of its 
citizens] privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile 
may also exact reciprocal duties."). 
362 Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) ("The short of the matter is 
that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of 
the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of 'traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice."'). 
363 !d. at 636 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[O]ur common understanding now, fortified by a 
century of judicial practice, is that jurisdiction is often a function of geography. The transient 
rule is consistent with reasonable expectations and is entitled to a strong presumption that it 
comports with due process."). 
364 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735-36. See also FREER & PERDVE, supra note 336, at 125. 
2015] Limiting Access to US. Courts 249 
suit was ~roper and the state of incorporation was a fixed place, like one's 
domicile. 65 Later, when the Court shifted its focus to its benefits-burden 
analysis, one could argue that a corporation willingly affiliates with a state in 
which it incorporates.366 Its board of directors makes a conscious choice 
almost certainly with an eye towards tax and liability issues.367 
"Principal place of business" has a shorter history. In some pre-
International Shoe cases, courts found personal jurisdiction proper in states 
where the corporation had its principal place ofbusiness.368 But the case law 
did not equate general jurisdiction with the principal place ofbusiness.369 
As indicated, an individual is subject to suit wherever she is domiciled 
because she has accepted benefits and protections of the law of that state.370 
She cannot complain that the suit did not arise out of any conduct in the 
forum. By analogy, a corporation that does a substantial amount of business 
in a particular state is certain!,y accepting benefits and protections of the state 
where a suit might be filed. 3 1 Further, given a host of decisions supporting 
jurisdiction based only on contacts,372 a corporation cannot claim surprise 
when it is haled into court for conduct unrelated to forum conduct.373 
365 Stein, supra note 350, at 547 ("(I]n the nineteenth century, [state of incorporation] was 
the only place that a corporation could be sued in personam insofar as its corporate status as a 
juridical person was only recognized in its state of incorporation."). 
366 See Brilmayer eta!. , supra note 46, at 733-34 ("[T]he corporation intentionally chooses 
to create a relationship with the state of incorporation, presumably to obtain the benefits of that 
state's substantive and procedural laws. Such a choice creates a unique relationship that 
justifies general jurisdiction over the corporation."); Stein, supra note 350, at 547 ("An entity's 
choice of incorporation in a particular state is entirely voluntary and involves continuing 
responsibility to and regulatory governance by the state."). 
367 See Cornett & Hoftheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 55) (noting that corporations 
often negotiate valuable tax benefits and other concessions from states in exchange for doing 
business there). 
368 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,317 ( 1945) (citing Hutchinson v. 
Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2nd Cir. 1930)). 
369 !d. at 317-19. 
370 !d. at 319. See also supra text accompanying note 53; Miliken v. Meyer, 3 11 U.S. 457, 
463 ( 1940) ("The state which accords [one of its citizens] privileges and affords protection to 
him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties."); Brilmayer et 
al., supra note 46, at 732 ("Domicile creates a unique relationship between the domiciliary and 
the forum state, a relationship composed of the benefits provided to the domiciliary and the 
burdens imposed by the state in consideration for those benefits."). 
37 1 See Brilmayer et al. , supra note 46, at 741 ("[T)he reciprocal benefits rationale obtains 
when the defendant carries out substantial activities, which implicate the police powers and 
public facilities of the state."). 
372 See Rhodes, supra note 54 (reviewing case law concerning jurisdiction based on 
defendants' contacts with the forum). 
373 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,3 11 , n.l8 (1980) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting), for a similar argument in Justice Brennan's dissent when he 
countered Justice White's argument that a defendant could not foresee being haled into court 
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Many lower courts did not pick up on a change in the rules governing 
general jurisdiction if the Court intended to make such a change. As two 
scholars found, courts were back to business as usual after Goodyear.374 
The reasons may be obvious; many courts favor a long jurisdictional reach 
to protect injured ~laintiffs . But the Court was about to narrow general 
jurisdiction further. 75 
ii. Daimler AG v. Bauman 
In 2004, twenty-three citizens of South American countries sued 
Daimler AG in a federal district court in California?76 The complaint alleged 
that Daimler collaborated with the military dictatorship in Argentina 
between 1976 and 1983 during the "Dirty War."377 Specifically, the 
complaint alleged that the defendant was responsible for killing, torturing, 
and kidnapping the plaintiffs and members of their families.378 
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.379 The plaintiffs argued that the defendant' s contacts with 
California were sufficient because of the extensive contacts of its subsidiary, 
Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA), which is inco~orated in Delaware with its 
principal place of business in New Jersey.3 0 MBUSA distributes the 
defendant's vehicles to independent dealerships throughout the United 
States.381 
The district court franted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.38 After initially affirming the district court, the Ninth 
Circuit reconsidered its decision and reversed?113 It concluded that MBUSA 
unless the defendant directed purposeful activity toward the forum-state. The majority's 
argument was entirely circular because a party cannot foresee where it will have to answer a 
suit until the Supreme Court has resolved the question. 
374 See, e.g., J.B. ex rei. Benjamin v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 12-cv-385, 2013 WL 452807, 
at 3 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (holding that the Court in Goodyear "did not replace or redefine the well-
established standard for establishing general jurisdiction"); see also Camilla Cohen, Comment, 
Goodyear Dunlop 's Failed Attempt to Refine the Scope of General Jurisdiction, 65 FLA. L. 
R EV. 1405, 1414-15 (2013); Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 3 n.14) 
(noting that " leading treatises assumed the Jaw remained well settled even after [Goodyear]"). 
375 See discussion infra Part IV.b.ii.B. See also Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 
(manuscript at 4). 
376 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750 (20 14). 
371 ld. at 750-51. 
378 !d. at 751. 
379 ld. at 75 1-52. 
380 !d. at 752. 
38 1 I d. 
382 !d. 
383 /d. at 753 
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was the defendant' s agent and attributed its forum contacts to the 
defendant.384 The Ninth Circuit did not address Goodyear.385 
The Supreme Court reversed? 86 The Court had at its disposal relatively 
narrow approaches that it could have used to decide the case before it. Apart 
from forum non-conveniens analysis,387 the Court could have found simply 
that MBUSA's contacts were not attributable to the defendant and that the 
remaining contacts were insufficient.388 It could also have ~oncluded that, 
even if the contacts were continuous and systematic, the assertion of 
jurisdiction was otherwise unreasonable?89 Instead, the Court went further. 
Justice Ginsburg made several observations, suggesting other possible 
arguments that may surface in the future. For example, she observed that the 
defendant "failed to object to plaintiffs' assertion that the California courts 
could exercise all-purpose jurisdiction over MBUSA."390 She also found that 
the Court did not have to decide on the standard to be used when a ~laintiff 
seeks to impute contacts of a subsidiary to its parent corporation.3 1 Thus, 
the Court did not reach the defendant' s argument that the subsidiary ' s 
contacts were to be imputed to the parent company "onll when the former is 
so dominated by the latter as to be its alter ego."39 Instead, the Court 
rejected the Ninth Circuit' s view because "[t]he Ninth Circuit's agency 
finding rested primarily on its observation that MBUSA's services were 
' important' to [the defendant], as gauged by [the defendant's] hypothetical 
readiness to perform those services itself if MBUSA did not exist."393 That 
proved too much. 394 
The Court assumed that MBUSA was "at home" in California and that 
384 Id at 753, 758-59. 
385 Jd at 753. 
386 /d. at 763. 
387 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v . Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 247 (1981); Cornett & 
Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 62-63) (observing the lack of plaintiff ties to the 
forum and the weak forum state interest in Daimler). 
388 See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759-60 (declining to decide if the contacts of a subsidiary 
would confer jurisdiction on the parent) . 
389 Id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("The Court can and should decide this case on 
the far simpler ground that, no matter how extensive Daimler' s contacts with California, that 
State's exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable given that the case involves foreign 
plaintiffs suing a foreign defendant based on foreign conduct . .. "). 
J90 Id. at 758 (majority opinion). 
391 /d. at 760. 
392 /d. at 759. 
393 !d. 
394 !d. at 7 59-60 ("The Ninth Circuit's agency theory thus appears to subject foreign 
corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an 
outcome that would sweep even beyond the 'sprawling view of general jurisdiction' we 
rejected in Goodyear."). 
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its contacts were "imputable to Daimler."395 Even on the assumption that 
MBUSA's contacts were imputable to the defendant, "Daimler's slim 
contacts with the State hardly render it at home [in Californiaf396 The 
analysis focused on Goodyear's discussion of general jurisdiction. 3 7 
While "Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to 
general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its 
principal place of business," Justice Ginsburg found that the plaintiffs' 
alternative reading of general jurisdiction swept too broadly.398 According to 
her, the plaintiffs' position would make a corporation subject to jurisdiction 
"in every State in which [it] 'engages in a substantial, continuous, and 
systematic course of business. "'399 Such a formulation - despite the view of 
many lower courts to the contrary - "is unacceptably grasping."400 
At that point in her opinion, Justice Ginsburg discussed an issue only 
hinted at in Goodyear. Recognizing that a corporation could have such 
extensive contacts with the forum to make it "at home" even if that state was 
not its state of incorporation or principal place of business, Justice Ginsburg 
found that was not plausible with regard to the defendant.401 That was so 
because even if a corporation had substantial connections with the forum, 
"the same global reach would presumabli be available in every other State 
in which MBUSA 's sales are sizeable.'"'0 The explanation of that statement 
was placed in a footnote where she dropped a bombshell: the general 
jurisdiction inquiry does not "focu[s] solely on the magnitude of the 
defendant's in-state contacts.'"'03 Instead, a court must appraise a 
corporation's activities in their entirety. Even if a corporation conducts 
billions of dollars' worth of business in the forum, that does not render the 
corporation "at home" in that state.404 
Justice Ginsburg, citing comity as a partial justification for the Court' s 
holding, wrote "[ o ]ther nations do not share the uninhibited approach to 
personal jurisdiction advanced by the Court of Appeals in this case.'"'05 The 
395 ld. at 760. 
396 I d. 
397 ld. at 760-62. 
398 Jd. at 760-61. 
399 I d. 
400 Id. at 761. 
401 I d. at 761 -62. 
402 Id. at 761. 
403 I d. at 762, n.20. Commentators have criticized Justice Ginsburg's opinion for being too 
zealous in protecting corporations from the "perceived evils of forum shopping," to the 
detriment of injured individuals who will now have more difficulty bringing lawsuits. See, e.g., 
Cornett & Hoftheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 5). 
404 Daimler, I 34 S. Ct. at 762, n.20. 
405 Id. at 763. Of course, even were her statement universally true, one can ask why an 
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Court observed that in the European Union, a corporate defendant generally 
may be sued only where it is domiciled - unless the claim arises out of the 
corporation's conduct in another location.406 The clear suggestion in 
Daimler is that the Court is bringing U.S. law into conformity with the 
prevailing European view. 
But Justice Ginsburg's suggestion that Daimler was bringing United 
States law in line with European law tells only part of the story. Regulations 
promulgated under the European Union Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters407 provide that 
an EU member state may normally exercise general jurisdiction over a 
European corporation only in a forum in which the corporation is 
dorniciled.408 Thus, one might argue that Justice Ginsburg is recognizing 
"best practices" within the EU.409 But the convention and regulations do not 
international norm should limit a state's constitutional power. 
406 See id. ("In the European Union, for example, a corporation may generally be sued in 
the nation in which it is 'domiciled,' a tenn defined to refer only to the location of the 
corporation 's 'statutory seat,' 'central administration,' or 'principal place of business."'). That 
definition of "domicile" may parallel the new general jurisdiction rule: Daimler does not limit 
general jurisdiction to the state of incorporation and principal place of business. Instead, it 
suggests there may be a state in which the corporation is nonetheless at home beyond the state 
of incorporation and state where it has its principal place of business. If one thinks about the 
seemingly unrelated context where the Court has redefined "principal place of business," as 
used in the diversity statute, the Court in Hertz Corp. v. Friend used the "nerve center," the 
state where high level administrative decisions are made, as the test for determining the 
principal place of business. 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (20 1 0). In doing so, the Court recognized that 
there may be some instances where the overwhelming majority of day-to-day activity took 
place in a state other than where top level management decisions were made. Jd. at 96. 
Potentially, that parallels domicile in the EU, since under the Brussels Regulation, domicile is 
defined by the domestic laws of each country, making it possible for a defendant to be 
domiciled in multiple countries. Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 59(1), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 
(EC). 
407 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32. This Convention, also known as 
the Brussels Convention, was largely superseded in 2001 by the Brussels Regulation with few 
changes. Council Regulation 44/2001,2001 O.J. (L 12) I (EC) [hereinafter Brussels 1]. 
408 Brussels 1, supra note 407. An important exception to this general rule is that a 
defendant corporation domiciled in the EU may be sued in a country where a co-defendant is 
domiciled, so long as the two claims "are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and 
determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate 
proceedings." Jd. 
409 As developed below, even if following the Brussels I regulation on general jurisdiction 
adheres to EU best practices, the Court may be putting plaintiffs suing in the United States at a 
disadvantage because the Supreme Court, or at least a substantial wing of the Court, is not 
committed to following the EU's liberal approach to specific jurisdiction. See infra notes 437-
44, 548-59, 566-69 and accompanying text; see also Brussels I, supra note 407, art. 5(3) 
(permitting a defendant to be sued "where the harmful event occurred or may occur," 
regardless of domicile); Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 60) (predicting 
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govern when a plaintiff seeks to assert jurisdiction over a corporation that is 
domiciled outside ofEurope.410 
Some European countries take a narrow view when a plaintiff seeks to 
assert jurisdiction over a non-European corporation on a claim that does not 
arise out of forum contacts.411 But other member states take a much more 
expansive approach. For example, German law allows the exercise of 
jurisdiction over a defendant who owns property in Germany even if the 
. 1 d h 1 . 412 property IS unre ate to t e c aim. 
France, Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have adopted 
j urisdictional rules that allow their citizens to sue any non-European 
defendant without regard to the defendant's contacts with the forum.413 
Obviously, plaintiffs securing judgments in such cases experience difficulty 
when seeking enforcement outside the forum nation.41 4 But as long as the 
defendant has assets in the forum, plaintiffs can enforce their judgments.415 
In light of the different approaches to jurisdiction among European and 
other trading partners, the Court's adoption of a restrictive interpretation of 
the Due Process Clause does not seem to be the most efficacious approach to 
international comity. Surely, comity would be advanced by an international 
u1 . ~ f. d 41 6 compact reg atmg en1orcement o JU gments. 
that the Court will continue to reject any attempts by plaintiffs to expand specific jurisdiction). 
410 See THOMAS 0. MAIN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 83 (Franklin A. Gevurtz, 
ed., 2006). 
411 See id. at 82 (discussing various approaches to personal jurisdiction in Europe; for 
instance, Italian courts will not exercise personal jurisdiction over non-Europeans in contracts 
cases if the contract was not formed in Italy). 
412 FREER&PERDUE,supra note336,at 137. 
413 MAIN, supra note 410, at 85. 
414 FREER & PERDUE, supra note 336, at 137. 
415 3 LINDA SILBERMAN, LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE § 97:6, PROCEDURE FOR 
ENFORCEMENT OF A FOREIGN JUDGMENT (20 15). While the Daimler Court seemed intent on 
joining the perceived European trend towards narrowing general jurisdiction, the European 
Court of Justice (EJC) may be expanding general jurisdiction, at least when the plaintiff is 
bringing a privacy claim. In the ECJ's recent decision, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola 
de Proteccion de Datos, the court held that Google, Inc., a California corporation, was subject 
to suit in Spain, not for the violation of a Spanish Jaw, but for the violation of an EU directive 
protecting against violations of privacy. Case C-1 3111 2, Google Spain SL v . Agencia Espanola 
de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) (May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documentl 
document.jsf?text=&docid= 152065&pagelndex=O&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first& 
part=l&cid=69003. Although Google 's conduct took place outside of Spain, the ECJ found 
that Google's Spanish subsidiary's marketing activities in Spain were attributable to Google. 
!d. 
416 The United States currently has no treaty or federal statute governing the enforcement 
of judgments rendered in foreign countries; procedures fo r enforcing foreign judgments vary 
by state. See DICKERSON, supra note 323, § 6.2 (discussing procedure for enforcing foreign 
judgments); SILBERMAN, supra note 415 (detailing the various procedures of states for the 
enforcement of a foreign judgments). Negotiations are currently underway regarding a possible 
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iii. Genera/Implications for General Jurisdiction 
As developed in more detail below in the discussion below,417 the 
implications for foreign corporations who seek to avoid litigation in the 
United States are significant. But even for a plaintiff suing a domestic 
corporation and seeking a convenient forum in the United States, the 
implications may be significant. 
Think back to the example that I borrowed from Ferens v. John 
Deere.418 There, the plaintiff engaged in some creative forum shopping 
made possible by our federal judicial system. John Deere did not challenge 
personal jurisdiction.419 Counsel for the defendant may have assumed that 
jurisdiction would have been upheld because the defendant's contacts with 
the forum state were so extensive. Alternatively, the jurisdiction might have 
been based on consent; that is, in many states, domestic corporations must 
appoint an agent for service of process in order to conduct business within 
the state.420 
Domestically, as long as legislatures keep in place such consent statutes 
and as long as the Court upholds such slightly coerced consent, plaintiffs 
may not lose their forum-shopping ability based on Goodyear and Daimler. 
That could change if industry groups pressure legislatures to narrow their 
consent statutes. In fact, some states already limit the scope of the 
appointment of an agent for receiving service of process to cases arising out 
of business conducted within the state.421 Thus, those states allow consent 
only in specific jurisdiction cases. In states with narrower statutes, Goodyear 
and Daimler will already have a significant impact. 
Consider the John Deere example. If Mississippi lacked a broad consent 
statute and the plaintiff relied on a general jurisdiction theory, the ,Elaintiff 
would have to prove that John Deere was "at home" in Mississippi. 22 Prior 
to Goodyear and Daimler, the plaintiff would have to prove that John Deere 
had continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state (and perhaps 
Hague Convention on the enforcement of judgments. 3 E. CHARLES ROUTH, LAws OF INT'L 
TRADE§ 76:4, ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMHITS: ARBITRATION AWARDS - UNDER 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION (2015). 
41 7 See discussion infra Part V. 
418 See supra note 299. 
419 Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 520 (1990). 
420 See supra text accompanying notes 150-53. 
421 !d. 
422 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 285 1 (20 11) 
("A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) 
corporations ... when their affiliations with the State are so 'continuous and systematic' as to 
render them essentially at home in the forum State."). See also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. 
Ct. 746, 761 (2014)(quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 285 1 (2011)). 
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that the assertion of jurisdiction was otherwise reasonable).423 John Deere's 
substantial business activity in the state, including large number of 
dealerships, would almost guarantee a finding of jurisdiction.424 Today, that 
is no longer true. 
The plaintiff would have to prove something more than John Deere's 
Mississippi contacts. As Justice Ginsburg stated in Daimler, John Deere 
would not necessarily be "at home" there.425 The court would have to 
examine John Deere's nationwide and worldwide contacts. With little 
guidance in the majority opinion, a plaintiff presumably would have to show 
that the forum state was the state in which an overwhelming majority of the 
defendant's activity took place in the forum state, even if that state was 
h . . . l 1 fb . 426 some ow not Its pnnc1pa p ace o usmess. 
This approach is a dramatic departure from a significant body of case 
law.427 Until Goodyear, the Court did not suggest such a narrow view of 
general jurisdiction.428 And the overwhelming body of lower court case law 
was to the contrary. 429 
Justice Ginsberg's opinion implies that the goal for her new test is 
twofold. First, it avoids unfair forum shopping.430 As she explained, without 
the narrowing of general jurisdiction, a Polish driver injured in Poland could 
sue Daimler in the United States.431 Second, despite the imprecision of her 
423 Rhodes, supra note 54, at 893-99 (discussing the development of the "continuous and 
systematic" contacts requirement, as well as the reasonableness or fairness factors). 
424 John Deere sells agricultural, construction, and forestry equipment at 38 dealerships 
throughout the state. John Deere Dealers in Mississippi, https://www.machinefinder.com/ww/ 
en-US/john-deere-dealers/mississippi (last visited Feb. 8, 20 14). 
425 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762, n.20. 
426 See id. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("(T]he majority announces the new rule that 
in order for a foreign defendant to be subject to general jurisdiction, it must not only possess 
continuous and systematic contacts with a forum State, but those contacts must also surpass 
some unspecified level when viewed in comparison to the company's 'nationwide and 
worldwide' activities."). See also Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 30-31) 
(noting that Justice Ginsburg stopped short of saying a corporation would never be subject to 
general jurisdiction outside its state of incorporation or principal place of business, but that 
such a case would be "exceptional"). 
427 See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J. , concurring) (referring to the test 
announced by the majority as "a new rule of constitutional law that is unmoored from decades 
of precedent."). 
428 See discussion supra Part IY.b.i.A. 
429 See Hoffheimer, supra note 275, at 549 (reviewing general jurisdiction pre-Goodyear). 
43° Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 5) (describing the majority as being 
in "a rush to protect defendants from the perceived evils of forum shopping"). 
43 1 Daimler, !34 S. Ct. at 751. The Court had no need to limit general jurisdiction to avoid 
allowing such a suit to proceed in a court in the United States. A defendant could easily invoke 
forum non conveniens to have the case dismissed. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 
248-49 (1981). Alternatively, as Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion in Daimler made 
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test,432 Justice Ginsburg believes that it offers greater clarity than does, for 
example, Justice Sotomayor's more traditional test which considers contacts 
and fairness factors.433 
Her analysis begs a question discussed above: what is the underlying 
justification for general jurisdiction?434 Neither Goodyear nor Daimler offer 
11. 435 B . .f d very compe mg answers. y companson, 1 ue process protects a 
defendant' s right to fair notice and an opportunity to be heard, rejecting 
general jurisdiction in a venue where a corporation may conduct extensive 
day-to-day activity makes little sense. Perhaps limiting general jurisdiction 
does not matter. After all, the scholars who proposed limiting general 
jurisdiction did so with the expectation that specific jurisdiction would be 
readily available.436 But as developed in the next section, some members of 
the Court are ready to narrow specific jurisdiction as well.437 
2. Specific Jurisdiction: Up in the Air 
In Daimler, Justice Ginsburg stated that, in effect, specific jurisdiction 
has expanded dramatically since it was "cut loose from Pennoyer' s sway," 
while general jurisdiction has "followed [a] markedly different 
trajector[y].',438 Her statement concerning specific jurisdiction may be 
premature. 
As indicated above, by 1990, the Court was deeply divided over the 
appropriate rules governing jurisdiction.439 This is most evident in Asahi, 
where the Court could not agree on the relevance of contacts that came about 
through the stream of commerce.440 At the root of the division was a 
disagreement dating back to the 1950s when the Court decided McGee and 
Hanson: must contacts come about through purposeful activity on the party 
of a defendant?44 1 Since 2010, the Court has revisited specific jurisdiction 
twice. In J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, the Court remained deeply 
clear, the Court could have held that even if defendant's contacts with the forum are 
substantial, jurisdiction is nonetheless unreasonable. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764 (Sotomayor, J. , 
concurring). 
432 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see supra p. 35. 
433 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764-65 (majority opinion). 
434 See supra pp. 30-31. 
435 See discussion supra Parts IV.b.i.A, IY.b.i.B. 
436 Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 58). 
437 See discussion infra Part IY.b.ii. 
438 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757-58. 
439 See supra Part Ill.b.i. 
440 See supra pp. 234-235. 
441 See supra text accompanying notes 101-05. 
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divided over the same issues that divided the Court in Asahi.442 And while 
the Court's most recent specific jurisdiction decision was unanimous,443 it 
signals the Court's willingness to limit the scope of specific jurisdiction.444 
1. J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro 
After Justice Stevens retired, commentators expected the Court to 
clarify the test for determining the sufficiency of the stream of commerce 
when it granted certiorari in Nicastro.445 That did not happen.446 
The plaintiff, Robert Nicastro, seriously injured his hand when he was 
operating a machine manufactured by J. Mcintyre, Ltd., a British 
corporation.447 The plaintiff sued in New Jersey where he worked and was 
injured.448 Perhaps because the plaintiffs lawyer engaged in limited 
discovery, the record demonstrated little contact between the defendant and 
the forum state.449 As observed by Justice Kennedy in his plurality opinion, 
"[t]he question here is whether the New Jersey courts have jurisdiction over 
J. Mcintyre, notwithstanding the fact that the compan/o at no time either 
marketed goods in the State or shipped them there.'.4 ° The quantity and 
quality of the defendant's contacts with New Jersey were a matter of dispute 
within the Court, with each of the three opinions offering a different view of 
442 J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
443 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). 
444 See discussion infra Part Y .a. 
445 See, e.g., Jonathan A. Berke !hammer, Supreme Court to Readdress Stream of 
Commerce Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 350, 351 (2011) ("The 
contours of the stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction ... have remained 
uncertain, at least, perhaps, until now."); Kendall Gray, J. Mcintyre Machinery v. Nicastro: 
Declarifying Asahi, APPELLATE RECORD (June 28, 2011), http:// www.appellaterecord.com/ 
20 11 /06/arti c les/new -opi n ions/j -me intyre-machinery-v-n icastro-declari fying -asah i 
("Professors and law nerds everywhere had the vapors because the Supreme Court of the 
United States had a chance to clear [Asahl] up in J. Mcintyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro."). 
446 See infra text accompanying notes 451-82. See also Elisabeth A. Beal, Note, J. 
Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro: The Stream-of-Commerce Theory of Personal 
Jurisdiction in a Globalized Economy, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233, 241-42 (2011) ("[N]o 
member of the Court could obtain a majority of the votes, and thus the status of the stream-of-
commerce theory of personal jurisdiction remains unclear."); Greg Saetrum, Note, Righting the 
Ship: Implications of J. Mcintyre v. Nicastro and How to Navigate the Stream of Commerce in 
Its Wake, 55 ARIZ. L. REv. 499, 536 (2013) ("The Nicastro decision has once again divided the 
stream-of-commerce analysis, with three separate paths emerging in the wake of the 
decision."). 
447 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (plurality opinion). 
448 /d. ; see also Beal, supra note 446, at 242. 
449 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792-93 (Breyer, J. , concurring) ("There may well have been 
other facts that Mr. Nicastro could have demonstrated in support of jurisdiction .. . the factual 
record leaves many open questions . .. "). 
450 /d. at 2786 (plurality opinion). 
-, 
I 
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the facts. 45 1 
Apparently, the defendant created a subsidiary, J. Mcintyre America, to 
market its products in the United States.452 By the time of trial, the 
subsidiary was bankrupt.453 In addition, as hinted at by Justice Breyer in his 
concurring opinion, the plaintiffs lawyer did not make an effort to show the 
degree of control exercised by the defendant over its American distributor.454 
As a result, the record was sparse. According to Justice Breyer's opinion, the 
record included evidence of the sale of only one machine in New Jersey, that 
the defendant hoped to sell its machines to anyone in the United States, and 
that its employees attended trade shows in the United States, but not in New 
Jersey specifically.455 Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion also observed that 
the plaintiff did not allege that J. Mcintyre America was under the 
defendant's control.456 He observed that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
relied in part on the fact that J. Mcintyre America "structured [its] 
advertising and sales efforts in accordance with [the defendant's] direction 
d "d h "bl "457 an gm ance w en ever poss1 e. 
Justice Ginsburg's dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, 
focused on efforts by the defendant to market its products in the United 
States.458 The defendant "engaged Mcintyre America to attract customers 
'from anywhere in the United States. "'459 It sought to "reach and profit from 
451 See id. at 2790 ("[U)p to four machines ended up in New Jersey"); id. at 2791 (Breyer, 
J., concurring) ("The American Distributor on one occasion sold and shipped one machine to a 
New Jersey customer ... "); id. at 2803 n.l5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The plurality notes the 
low volume of sales in New Jersey . _ . A $24,900 shearing machine, however, is unlikely to 
sell in bulk worldwide, much less in any given state. By dollar value, the price of a single 
machine represents a significant sale. Had a manufacturer sold in New Jersey $24,900 worth of 
flannel shirts . . _ [t]he Court would presumably find the defendant amenable to suit in that 
State."). Justice Ginsburg also cited information concerning the robust scrap metal industry in 
New Jersey while Justice Kennedy did not consider this information - perhaps because he 
viewed it as not properly part of the record. Adam N_ Steinman, The Lay of the Land: 
Examining the Three Opinions in J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 
48 1, 494-95 (20 12). 
452 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J _, dissenting). 
453 !d. at 2796 n.2. 
454 !d. at 2792-93 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
455 !d. at 2791 (Breyer, J. , concurring). In fac t, the case did not turn out to be a stream-of-
commerce case. The facts did not present the Court with an assertion of jurisdiction over a 
component parts manufacrurer who shipped the product to another company that then 
incorporated the component part into a finished product and that then shipped the product to 
the forum. Jd. 
456 !d. at 2786 (plurality opinion). 
457 /d. 
458 /d. at 2794, 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
459 !d. at 2796-97 (Ginsburg, J , dissenting). 
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the United States market as a whole."460 Justice Ginsburg found that the 
defendant must have intended to sell its product in the "largest scrap metal 
market" in the United States when it targeted the national market.461 
Six Justices disagreed with her approach. Using Hanson as the starting 
point for his analysis, Justice Kennedy and four Justices462 agreed that "[a]s 
a general rule, the exercise of judicial power is not lawful unless the 
defendant 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws. ,,463 The plurality rejected the idea that due process involved a general 
notion of fair process on the grounds that "[f]reeform notions of fundamental 
fairness divorced from traditional practice cannot transform a judgment 
rendered in the absence of authority into law.'.464 Citing Hanson again, 
Justice Kennedy emfshasized the fact that a defendant must act with purpose 
towards the forum.4 5 According to the plurality, a defendant must submit to 
the state's authority and may do so in a number of ways, including through 
explicit consent, presence within the state, citizenship or domicile, 
incorporation in the state or establishment of a principal place of business in 
the state.466 These examples demonstrate circumstances or a course of 
conduct from which to infer "an intention to submit to the laws of the forum 
State.'.467 For out-of-state defendants, acting with purpose towards the state 
provides similar evidence that the defendant submits to the state's authority 
with regards to suits arising out of the forum contact.468 As developed 
below, the plurality staked out a radical position, harking back to the 
rejected theory· of consent.469 
For Justices Breyer and Alito, the case before the Court did not raise 
many of the yet unresolved challenges facing courts around the country.470 
460 !d. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
461 !d. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
462 !d. at 2785 (plurality opinion). 
463 /d. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). Justice Kennedy 
acknowledged that exceptions may exist, "for instance, in cases involving an intentional tort. 
But the general rule is applicable in this products-liability case, and the so-called 'stream-of-
commerce ' doctrine cannot displace it." /d. 




468 Jd. at 2787-88. 
469 See id. at 2798-99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (" [I]n International Shoe itself, and 
decisions thereafter, the Court has made plain that legal fictions, notably . . . ' implied consent,' 
should be discarded ... . Whatever the state of academic debate over the role of consent in 
modem jurisdictional doctrines, the plurality's notion that consent is the animating concept 
draws no support from controlling decisions of this Court."). 
470 /d. at 2791-95 (Breyer, J. , concurring). 
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Recognizing that many changes in commerce and communications may 
require rethinking the Court's precedent, Justice Breyer found that Nicastro 
did not present those questions.471 He underscored that the plaintiff failed to 
meet his burden of demonstrating sufficient contacts with the forum state.472 
Mcintyre America was "an independent distributor.'"'73 The distributor had 
only made one sale in New Jersey even though the defendant was willing to 
sell machines to anyone interested in buying them anywhere in the United 
States.474 Justice Breyer rejected the idea that the Court's precedent allowed 
the assertion of jurisdiction based on a single sale "accompanied by the kind 
of sales effort indicated here.''475 The concurring opinion suggested that the 
two Justices might be open to a stream of commerce argument but found that 
the record showed no regular flow of goods into the forum.476 
The concurring opinion rejected the idea that the mere arrival of the 
product in the forum state should lead to jurisdiction.477 The opinion left 
open a number of questions and suggested participation by the Solicitor 
General, presumably to provide a better insight into broad concerns about 
modern commercial circumstances.478 
Discussed in more detail below, the current state of affairs after 
Nicastro is troubling.479 Justice Kennedy is one vote short of significantly 
. .fi . . d. . Th d. 480 d h 481 h d narrowmg spec1 1c JUriS tchon. e tssent an ot ers ave commente 
471 /d. at 2791 (Breyer, J. , concurring). 
472 /d. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). ("Mr. Nicastro, who bears the burden of proving 
jurisdiction, has shown no specific effort by the British Manufacturer to sell in New Jersey. He 
has introduced no list of potential New Jersey customers ... And he has not otherwise shown 
that the British Manufacturer 'purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities ' within New Jersey, or that it delivered goods in the stream of commerce ' with the 
expectation that they will be purchased' by New Jersey users."). 
473 /d. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
474 Jd. 
475 /d. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). No doubt, he had in mind the fact that the 
defendant did not create the contact. Surely, he did not intend to disavow single contact cases 
like McGee. 
476 /d. at 2792-93 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Because the incident at issue in this case does 
not implicate modem concerns, and because the factual record leaves many open questions, 
this is an unsuitable vehicle for making broad pronouncements that refashion basic 
jurisdictional rules."). 
477 /d. at 2792 (Breyer, J. , concurring). 
478 /d. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
479 See discussion infra Part V; see also Saetrum, supra note 446, at 519 ("If the plurality 
opinion in Nicastro was subsequently adopted by a majority of the Court, foreign 
manufacturers would have a blueprint for escaping U.S. jurisdiction while simultaneously 
exploiting the U.S. market. This would place U.S. manufactures at a severe competitive 
disadvantage to their foreign counterparts and force many U.S. consumers to suffer the 
burdens of litigating products-liability claims overseas."). 
480 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2798-99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[I]n International Shoe 
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on the theory implicit in the plurality opinion, which is the idea that one had 
to consent to jurisdiction. In Nicastro, Justice Ginsburg argued that the 
theory was rejected long ago and finds flO support in the Court's modern 
case law.482 
Justice is a reminder of the point raised above that hard cases make bad 
law.483 A decision that seemed out of line with the Court's then current view 
of due process evidenced in McGee and grounded in overt result orientation 
has become the centerpiece of the conservative Justices' due process 
jurisprudence.484 Unlike Justice White's opinion in World-Wide, where he 
linked the contacts part of the Court's test to sovereignty,485 Justice Kennedy 
does not fall into that morass. Instead, he gives predominant importance to a 
defendant's choice to make itself amenable to suit in the forum.486 Hence, a 
defendant who can point to no great inconvenience or lack of opportunity to 
be heard may avoid suit in a forum despite benefiting indirectly from the 
sales of its product in the forum state. 
ii. Walden v. Fiore: Closing Open Questions? 
The Court's split in Nicastro has left lower courts with little 
guidance.487 A number of lower courts have continued to uphold jurisdiction 
in cases where the defendant did not direct purposeful activity towards the 
forum state.488 For example, some state courts continue to adhere to the 
itself, and decisions thereafter, the Court has made plain that legal fictions, notably ... 
'implied consent,' should be discarded . .. "). 
481 See Steinman, supra note 451, at 497 ("A second aspect of Justice Kennedy's opinion 
is his insistence that jurisdiction is appropriate only when a person 'submi (ts] to a State's 
authority"'); see also Saetrum, supra note 446, at 516 (noting that very few corporations ever 
consciously submit to the power of a state). 
482 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2798-99 (Ginsburg, J ., dissenting) ("Whatever the state of 
academic debate over the role of consent in modem jurisdictional doctrines, he plurality's 
notion that consent is the animating concept draws no support from controlling decisions of 
this Court."). 
483 I d. at 2787. See also supra Part ll.c. 
484 See discussion supra Part II.c.; see also Borchers, supra note 325, at 1246 (criticizing 
the plurality opinion as an attempt "to roll back the clock by a century or more and re-ground 
personal jurisdiction in a dubious sovereignty theo1y that the Court had apparently rejected 
several times before"). 
485 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,291-92 (1980). 
486 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787-88. 
487 See Steinman, supra note 451, at 491 ("The lack of any majority opinion in Mcintyre 
largely thwarts the possibility of' greater c larity"'); see also Amanda ller, Comment, Bridging 
the Stream of Commerce: Recommendations for Living in the Post-Nicastro Era, 45 
MCGEORGE L. REv. 407, 409 (2013) ("[I]n Nicastro, a divided Court issued no clear guidance 
or test ... "). 
488 Iler, supra note 487, at 415 (citing a Louisiana decision where the judge stated that 
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stream of commerce theory to assure a convenient forum for the plaintiff.489 
Some commentators expected the Court to use the second personal 
jurisdiction case on the 2013 docket, Walden v. Fiore, to clarify some of the 
. . 490 I d.d ongomg tssues. t 1 not. 
Transportation Security Administration agents searched Gina Fiore and 
Keith Gipson and their carry-on luggage as they departed from the San Juan, 
Puerto Rico airport.491 The agents found a large amount of cash in their 
luggage.492 Fiore explained to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
agents in San Juan that she and Gipson were professional gamblers and had 
been gambling at a San Juan casino.493 A law enforcement official in San 
Juan contacted DEA agents in Atlanta and told them about Fiore and 
G. 494 1pson. 
Upon their arrival in Atlanta, Fiore and Gipson were stopped by 
Anthony Walden, a Covington, Georgia police officer, deputized as part of a 
task force in the DEA's airport drug interdiction program.495 Fiore and 
Gipson told Walden and another agent that the cash they were carrying was 
their gambling "bank" plus winnings.496 The agents retained the cash after 
they exposed it to a drug-sniffing dog.497 Fiore and Gipson flew home 
without the cash.498 
The DEA refused to return the cash despite the efforts of Fiore and 
Justice Breyer's opinion was binding, but that Justice Breyer had declined to accept a new 
rule, the court declined to depart from Fifth Circuit precedent). 
489 See Ainsworth v. Moffett Engineering, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(reading Nicastro narrowly and disagreeing that it prohibited the application of the stream-of-
commerce theory in other types of cases); AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 
1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("Because Mcintyre did not produce a majority opinion, we must 
follow the narrowest holding among the plurality opinions in that case ... that the law remains 
the same after Mcintyre."); see also Levi McAllister, Comment, Paddling the Stream of 
Commerce: The Supreme Court's Need to Cautiously Re-Examine One Aspect of Personal 
Jurisdiction, and the Judicial and Financial Consequences Resulting from Current 
Approaches, 3 HIGH CT. Q. REv. 53, 57-58 (2007) (discussing splits among lower courts 
following Nicastro). 
490 See, e.g., Stephen Higdon, Comment, If It Wasn't on Purpose, Can a Court Take It 
Personally? Untangling Asahi 's Mess that J. Mcintyre Did Not, 45 TEX. TECH L. REv. 463, 
496 n.259 ("(T]he Court has granted certiorari to another personal jurisdiction case . . . . 
Perhaps, then, clarity - rather than continued confusion - is on the horizon."). 
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Gipson's attorney.499 Instead, Walden helped draft an affidavit as Bart of 
forfeiture proceedings and forwarded it to the U.S. Attorney's Office. 00 The 
government did not pursue forfeiture and eventually retun1ed the money to 
Fiore and Gipson.501 
Fiore and Gipson filed suit against Walden in federal court in 
Nevada.502 Their complaint alleged a violation of their Fourth Amendment 
rights based on illegal seizure and detention of their cash.503 Furthermore, 
they alleged that Walden's affidavit was false and misleading in that it 
misrepresented the encounter at the airport and excluded exculpatory 
information. 504 Walden filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.505 The district court granted the motion, which the Ninth Circuit 
reversed. 506 While it agreed that the illegal search part of the claim could not 
support jurisdiction in Nevada, the court could exercise jurisdiction based on 
the "false probable cause aspect of the case."507 According to the Ninth 
Circuit, under Calder v. Jones, Walden "expressly aimed" his conduct at 
Nevada508 when he submitted the affidavit because he knew that it would 
affect the plaintiffs - who had a significant connection with the forum.509 
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.510 The 
opinion laid out the general rules governing specific jurisdiction.511 A 
defendant must create the contacts with the forum. 12 Due process protects a 
litigant's liberty interest, "not the convenience of plaintiffs or third 
parties."513 A plaintiffs act in creating contacts with the forum does not 
499 !d. 
500 !d. at 1119-20. 
501 /d. at 1120. 
502 /d. ("Respondents alleged that petitioner violated their Fourth Amendment rights by 
( I) seizing the cash without probable cause; (2) keeping the money after concluding it did not 
come from drug-related activity; (3) drafting and forwarding a probable cause affidavit to 
support a forfeiture action while knowing the affidavit contained false statements; (4) willfully 
seeking forfeiture while withholding exculpatory information; and (5) withholding that 
exculpatory information from the United States Attorney's Office."). 
503 !d. at 1119-20. 
504 !d. at 1120. 
505 !d. 
506 /d. 
507 /d. (quoting Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558,577 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
5os Jd. (quoting Fiore, 688 F.3d at 577). 
509 /d. at 1119-20. 
510 !d. at 1119-22. 
51 1 !d. at 1122 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 47 1 U.S. 462,475 ( 1985)). 
512 Jd. 
513 /d. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 41 7 
(1984); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1958); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980)). 
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count.514 A defendant's contacts must be with the forum state, not with an 
individual in the state.515 But those general rules did not square!~ address the 
plaintiffs' strongest argument, their reliance on Calder v. Jones. 16 
Lower courts are divided over how broadly to read Calder.517 Justice 
Thomas gave it a narrow reading. "These same principles," as laid out 
above, "apply when intentional torts are involved."518 He explained that 
Calder turned on "the various contacts the defendants had created with 
California (and not just with the plaintiff) by writing the allegedly libelous 
story."519 The crux of Calder was that the effects of the defendants ' conduct 
connected the defendants with the forum; defendants' intentional tort oflibel 
occurred in California where the loss of the plaintiffs reputation took 
place.520 
By contrast, none of Walden's conduct took place in Nevada.52 1 He 
never traveled to, sent anything to, or took any action in Nevada.522 The 
plaintiffs, not the defendant, formed the contacts with the forum.523 Justice 
Thomas rejected the Ninth Circuit's view that Walden's knowledge that 
Fiore and Gipson had forum connections was dispositive.524 Even if the 
focus is on the continuation of the seizure of the funds, those effects are not 
attributable to Walden; the plaintiffs chose where to go after they were 
deprived of their funds. 525 
Post- Walden ana~sis has focused on the difficult line drawing between 
Calder and Walden.5 6 Some commentators conclude that Walden was a 
514 !d. 
515 !d. at 1122-23. 
516 !d. 
517 Compare Janmark v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[T)here can be no 
serious doubt after Calder that the state in which the victim of a tort suffers the injury may 
entertain a suit against the accused tortfeasor."), with IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 
F.3d 254, 265 (3rd Cir. 1998) ("[W]e ... agree with the conclusion reached by the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that jurisdiction under Calder requires more 
than a finding that the harm caused by the defendant's intentional tort is primarily felt within 
the forum."). 
518 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123. 
519 !d. at 1123-24. 
520 !d. 




525 !d. at 1125. 
526 See, e.g. , Advanced Tactical Ordnance Systems, LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 
751 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 20 14) (addressing the split that had existed among courts regarding 
Calder, and stating that Walden helped resolve some of the ambiguity: "[A]fter Walden there 
can be no doubt that 'the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the 
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fairly easy case.527 For example, at the time of the stop in San Juan, th~ 
plaintiffs showed the agents California identification.52 They maintained 
residences in Nevada and Califomia.529 As a result, the fact that effects may 
have been felt in Nevada appears random. Other scholars have defended the 
Ninth Circuit's position and sug~est that the court's unanimous opinion 
downplayed the effects in Nevada. 30 
As developed by Justice Thomas, one might agree that even under a 
broad reading of Calder, the case for jurisdiction was weak. Walden 
presumably knew that the plaintiffs were going to Nevada - they were 
taking a flight to Las Vegas - but may not have been aware that they 
resided in Califomia.53 1 Somewhat more troubling is that Justice Thomas 
interpreted the black letter law as requiring the application of the same 
principles from intentional tort cases in personal jurisdiction cases; meaning 
jurisdiction must be based on "intentional conduct by the defendant that 
creates the necessary contacts with the forum."532 Although not without 
ambiguity, that language sounds narrower than the language in Calder, 
where the Court observed that the defendants "knew" that the effects would 
be felt in the forum state.533 
Justice Thomas joined Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion in Nicastro, 
where Justice Kennedy insisted that only purposeful contacts with the forum 
are sufficient.534 It remains uncertain whether Justice Thomas has moved the 
Court closer to adopting that narrow view of minimum contacts . As 
developed below, such a position would have significant implications for the 
state courts attempting to assert jurisdiction over foreign and many out-of-
forum. "' (quoting Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122)). 
527 See Howard Wasserman, More Personal Jurisdiction from SCOTUS, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(Feb. 25, 2014, 4:14 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/20 14/02/more-personal-
jurisdiction-from-scotus.html; see also Supreme Court Says P's Gambling Winnings, Seized by 
Drug Agent in State A, Can 't Support Jurisdiction of Agent in State B, 267 SIEGEL'S PRAC. 
REv. 4 (2014) ("Considering the court's decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman only a few months 
ago . .. the Walden case is no surprise. In Daimler the U.S. Supreme Court severely 
circumscribed the 'presence' test as a basis for personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations. 
The claim itself must have local roots, the (C]ourt held, and if it hasn' t, the corporation's 
overall contacts with the state won' t support jurisdiction."). 
528 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119. 
529 !d. 
530 See, e.g., Charles W. Rhodes & Cassandra B. Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in 
Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 227-230 (20 14) (suggesting that the Ninth 
Circuit was justified in finding jurisdiction proper under Calder given the state of the law prior 
to Walden). 
531 Walden 134 S. Ct. at 1119, 1125. 
532 !d. at I 123. 
533 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 ( 1984). 
534 J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 13 1 S. Ct. 2780,2787-88 (20 11). 
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state defendants.535 
V. AVOIDING SUIT IN THE UNITED STATES 
Goodyear and Daimler are clear on one thing: plaintiffs will be able to 
invoke general jurisdiction in fewer locations than before those cases were 
decided.536 Seldom will a plaintiff be able to invoke general jurisdiction 
when the defendant is a forei~ corporation.537 Harder questions arise with 
regard to specific jurisdiction. 38 This section begins with some speculation 
about the various Justices' motivations in aligning ·themselves on 
jurisdictional questions.539 It then explores the implications that the Court's 
new retrenchment has for foreign corporations. 540 
A. Pity the Poor Defendant? 
A good place to start is accusing the conservative wing of the Court of a 
pro-corporate bias.541 Cases like Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission support such a conclusion.542 Of course, that cannot explain the 
535 See discussion infra Part V. 
536 See supra Part JY.b.i.; see also Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 4) 
(discussing the shrinking of general jurisdiction in the wake of Goodyear and Daimler). 
537 Foreign corporations are not incorporated in the United States and do not have their 
principal places of business in the United States. Finding a case in which the largest amount of 
a foreign corporation's business nonetheless takes place in a state within the United States 
seems highly unlikely. 
538 See infra text accompanying notes 548-59, 565-71; see also Cornett & Hoffheimer, 
supra note 9 (manuscript at 60) (predicting that the Court will continue to reject any attempts 
by plaintiffs to expand speci fie jurisdiction). 
539 See discussion infra Part V.a. 
540 See discussion infra Part V .b. 
541 See Ian Millhiser, Supreme Court Ruled in Favor of the Nation's Top Corporate 
Interest Group in 7 of 8 Cases This Term, THTNKPROGRESS (March 13, 2014), 
http://th inkprogress.org/justice/20 14/03/ 13/3 398661 /supreme-court-ruled-in-favor-of-the-
nations-top-corporate-interest-group-in-7 -of-8-cases-this-term (reporting that during the 
current term, the Court has sided with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in almost every case 
where the Chamber has filed a brief); see also Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript 
at 64-65) ("Taken to their logical conclusion, Justice Ginsburg' s formal rules introduce a new 
era of vested rights for corporations ... cloaking corporations with unprecedented immunities 
that were never suggested by earlier decis ions ... "). 
542 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm' n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that the First 
Amendment prohibited a law limiting political expenditures by corporations and labor unions); 
See also Woody R. Clermont, Business Associations Reign Supreme: The Corporatist 
Underpinnings of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 27 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 
4 77 (20 I 0) (criticizing Citizens United and the conservative members of the Court for favoring 
corporate personhood over the rights of individuals); Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 
(manuscript at 64) (arguing that Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Daimler demonstrated her desire 
268 University of California, Davis [Vol. 21:2 
result in Walden, where the defendant was not a business entity.54 3 The 
conservative wing of the Court might also be accused of an anti-plaintiff 
bias - willing to narrow the courthouse door in cases involving the 
historically liberal pleading rules.544 
As mentioned above, Daimler suggested that the Court was intent on 
bringing United States law in line with European law.545 Elsewhere, some of 
the conservatives on the Court have railed against reliance on international 
norms in interpreting domestic law.546 They were, however, silent on Justice 
Ginsburg's reliance on European law. 
While one might see the conservative Justices' pro-corporate bias at 
work in their views, dismissing the "liberal" wing as pro-corporate seems 
too facile an explanation for their positions in Goodyear, Daimler, and 
Walden. Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Nicastro suggests a different 
possibility. As argued by Professors Cornett and Hoffheimer, Justice 
Ginsburg's general jurisdiction opinions relied on the views of prominent 
scholars who urged the narrowing of general jurisdiction.547 They faulted the 
Court for not recognizing that the argument for narrowing general 
jurisdiction was premised on the expansion of specific jurisdiction.548 At 
least in light of Justice Ginsburg's Nicastro dissent, she and Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan would have found s~ecific jurisdiction on the facts of 
Nicastro by relying on traditional case law. 49 
to "effectuat[e] corporate planning track arguments repeatedly advanced by the Chamber of 
Commerce of the U.S."). 
543 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119 (2014). 
544 See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (dismissing a case because it 
failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim despite liberal pleading rules); Adam N. 
Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1293, 1325-26 (2010) (discussing Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal as examples of "the Court's recent pro-
defendant leanings," stating that "the Court gave defendants one more tool for thwarting civil 
accountability by discarding the long-established, liberal pleading framework that was among 
the most notable aspects oftbe original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." ). 
545 See supra pp. 253-255. 
546 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622-28 (2005) (Scalia, J. , dissenting) 
(denouncing the majority opinion for citing as persuasive authority the international trend 
toward abolishing capital punishment for juveniles, stating that "the basic premise of the 
Court's argument - that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world-
ought to be rejected out of hand."). 
547 Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 58) ("Justice Ginsburg's opinions 
advocate a particular agenda for reforming the law of personal jurisdiction proposed in the 
1960s and 1970s by Professors von Mehren and Trautman."). 
548 /d. ("Given the expanding role [Professors von Mehren and Trautman] proposed for 
specific jurisdiction, they regarded most of the fonns of general jurisdiction as unnecessary 
and irrational. They thus urged the elimination of almost all forms of general jurisdiction."). 
549 J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 13 1 S. Ct. 2780, 2804 (201 1) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the defendant should have been subject under a specific jurisdiction 
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The four recent decisions are unsettling. While Justice Alito joined 
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Nicastro,550 his usual alliance with 
the conservative wing of the Court is not reassuring.551 It is unclear whether 
Justice Alito will join an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, squarely 
requiring a plaintiff to show that a defendant purposefully directed activity 
in the forum state. Especially in light of other developments - limiting in 
rem actions and narrowing general jurisdiction - such a ruling would 
severely limit a plaintiffs ability to bring suit in their home state in a variety 
of cases.552 
That the Court has limited the jurisdictional reach of United States 
courts seems odd at this point in history. As observed by Justice Breyer in 
his concurring opinion in Nicastro, commerce and communications may 
require rethinking the Court's traditional approach to personal 
jurisdiction.553 The trend towards sweeping international trade agreements554 
theory). 
55° !d. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
551 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310,316 (2010) (Justice 
Alito joined the majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Scalia); see also General William K. Suter, Supreme Court Report, 44 
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 333, 337 (2012) ("The so-called conservatives are the Chief Justice and 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ali to. Chief Justice and Justice A lito voted together about 95% of 
the time."); Eric Alterman & Reed Richardson, Splenetic Justice: Justice Samuel A/ito's Role 
on the Roberts Court, Tiffi NATION (June 28, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/blog/175026/ 
splenetic-justice-justice-samuel-alitos-role-roberts-court ("Thanks to Alito, who replaced the 
moderate Justice O'Connor on the Court, the conservative bloc has scored one triumph after 
another, and increasingly it's been in service of corporation-friendly organizations like the 
Chamber of Commerce."); Jeremy Bowers et al., Which Supreme Court Justices Vote Together 
Most and Least Often, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 20 14), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/ 
06/24/upshot/24up-scotus-agreement-rates.html (finding that over the last four terms, Justice 
A lito has voted with Justice Roberts 93% of the time, Justice Scalia 86% of the time, Justice 
Thomas 90% of the time, and Justice Kennedy 85% of the time, while only voting with 
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan far less often - 65, 69, and 69%, respectively); 
Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/20J0/07/25/us/25roberts.html (stating that Justice Alito is one 
of the six most conservative Justices that have sat on the Court out of the 44 Justices who have 
served since 1937, calling him "exceptionally conservative"); Lee Epstein et al., How Business 
Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REv. 1431, 1450 (2013) (finding that Justice Alito is 
one of the two most business-friendly justices to serve on the Court since 1946). 
552 See discussion infra Part V.b. 
553 J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791, 2795 (2011) (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (discussing increasing globalization and advances in technology, suggesting 
that a change in current law may be justified given "a better understanding of the relevant 
contemporary commercial circumstances."). 
554 Hemandez, supra note 323, at 432-33 (noting that "the globalization of commerce over 
the past 50 years presents a dramatic shift in American society" and that "the abandonment of 
a manufacturing-based economy in the late twentieth century has resulted in the explosive 
growth in foreign goods, which necessitates ... enabl[ing] states to provide redress to their 
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and the access to infonnation via the Intemet555 multiply the instances in 
which United States plaintiffs may seek to force an injury-causing foreign 
defendant to respond to suit in the United States, rather than in a foreign 
country.556 At a minimum, injured plaintiffs want to avoid the added expense 
of trying their cases abroad. Often, doing so involves not just added expense, 
but less favorable substantive law557 and possible costs, including attorneys' 
fees assessed to the losing party. 558 Further, foreign judges and duries may be 
unsympathetic to Americans seeking damages in their courts.5 9 Given these 
considerations, one might have expected the trend to be more protective of 
injured citizens. 
B. How Real is the Problem? 
Currently, a plaintiff suing a domestic corporation in a convenient 
forum may be able to do so without difficulty. That is, Goodyear and 
Daimler may have limited effect as long as the state where the plaintiff files 
the action requires the corporation to appoint an agent for purposes of 
citizens for injuries caused by defective goods manufactured abroad."); see also THOMAS A. 
DICKERSON, LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL TORTS IN U.S. COURTS § 1. (20 13) ("As the 
world 's economy becomes more integrated, products and services move with increasing 
frequency across national borders ... American courts and lawyers wrestle with ... Providing 
redress when foreign products cause harm in the U.S.") . 
555 See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) 
(establishing the "sliding scale" Internet jurisdiction test that considers the level of interactivity 
or passivity of a defendant's website rather than purposeful availrnent); CompuServe, Inc. v. 
Patterson, 89 F .3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant purposefully availed 
himself of the privilege of doing business in the forum state, despite never having traveled 
there, by creating an ongoing marketing relationship with the plaintiff corporation 
headquartered in the forum); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(surveying approaches adopted by other courts, including the Zippo test, as well as tests that 
examine the number of "hit" a website receives and other evidence that the Internet activity 
was directed at the forum state). 
556 For instance, following Nicastro, the plaintiff would have to sue in the UK in order to 
recover for his injuries - resulting in added expenses, inconvenience, and other disadvantages 
associated with litigating overseas. 
557 FREER & PERDUE, supra note 336, at 62-63. 
55H See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 n.l8 (1975) 
("As early as 1278, the courts of England were authorized to award counsel fees to successful 
plaintiffs in litigation. Similarly, since 1607 English courts have been empowered to award 
counsel fees to defendants in all actions where such awards might be made to p laintiffs. Rules 
governing administration of these and related provisions have developed over the years. It is 
now customary in England, after litigation of substantive claims had terminated, to conduct 
separate hearings before special 'taxing Masters' in order to determine the appropriateness and 
the size of an award of counsel fees.") . 
559 FREER & PERDUE, supra note 336, at 62. 
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accepting service of process.560 This is the case at least in states where the 
state statute allows suit on any claim, not just one arising out of in-state 
activity.561 As mentioned above, one rnight.expect business organizations to 
lobby state legislatures to narrow such statutes.562 But even after Goodyear 
and Daimler, a plaintiff suing a domestic corporation ought to be able to find 
at least one state in which it has its principal place of business or state of 
incorporation.563 That forum may not be convenient for the plaintiff and maJ: 
not be able to provide favorable choice of law rules as in the past.5 
Nonetheless, the impact on plaintiffs may be muted. 
As to specific jurisdiction, if the Court adopts a hard-and-fast 
purposeful availment rule, an injured plaintiff may be at a real disadvantage 
even when suing a domestic corporation in the state where the injury took 
place. Think back to Mrs. Gray, injured when her hot water heater 
exploded. 565 If the stream of commerce does not allow her to bring her claim 
against Titan Valve, she may be forced to bifurcate her claim, try her case in 
an inconvenient forum, or sue only the manufacturer that sold the product in 
the forum with the risk of having the primary tortfeasor absent from the suit. 
The implications are even more pronounced for United States plaintiffs 
suing foreign corporations. Goodyear and Daimler appear to leave little 
room for an American injured by a foreign corporation to sue that 
corporation in the United States based on an accident occurring abroad. 
Unlike the plaintiffs in Daimler, the plaintiffs in Goodyear were United 
States citizens.566 But for the fact that Goodyear USA, the garent 
corporation, was subject to suit somewhere in the United States, 67 the 
560 See supra text accompanying notes 150-53. 
561 !d. 
562 See supra text accompanying note 421 . A litigant might also attempt to challenge such 
statutes as coercive and in violation of the Commerce Clause. Early precedent suggested that 
argument. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919). 
563 One might wonder whether a corporation 's state of incorporation is a suitable forum 
for all-purpose jurisdiction. That corporation would have chosen that forum for tax purposes 
and perhaps because of favorable forum law. Those considerations have little to do with 
convenience to any of the litigants. Despite that, as Goodyear and Daimler demonstrate, courts 
routinely recite the black letter law that the state of incorporation is an appropriate forum. I 
find the staying power of that rule of law odd. I have not been able to find any modem case in 
which the corporate defendant' s only contact with the forum state is its state of incorporation. 
564 See generally Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (finding that although the 
injury occurred in Pennsylvania, the plaintiffs were able to file suit in Mississippi and take 
advantage of a favorable statute of limitations because John Deere Co. had continuous and 
systematic contacts there). 
565 See supra p. 11. 
566 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,2850 (2011). 
561 Goodyear, 13 I S. Ct. at 2850 ("Goodyear USA, which had plants in North Carolina 
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plaintiffs' only recourse would have been to sue abroad in France, 
Luxembourg, or Turkey. Few foreign corporations, if any, are likely to 
satisfy Justice Ginsburg's "at home" test in any state within the United 
States.568 Even if they conduct a massive amount of business in a particular 
state, that alone is not enough.569 Her test focuses not only on the amount of 
business in state, but it also requires that the amount of business in that state 
predominates; systematic and continuous contacts are not sufficient.570 That 
standard is a major departure from precedent and far more rigorous than the 
previous standard. Predicting how the new test applies may be difficult, but 
the test seems to require a showing of more than substantial contacts with 
the forum: "[g]eneral jurisdiction ... calls for an appraisal of a corporation's 
activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that 
operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them. "57 1 
Surprisingly, only Justice Sotomayor picked up on the significant 
change in the law that the Court made in the Diarnler decision. 572 Instead of 
focusing on in-state contacts, the Court also now requires an inquiry into 
contacts elsewhere. As she quipped, some corporations are "too big for 
general jurisdiction."573 She may have understated the extent to which the 
Court has changed the law, as can be seen by comparing the new standard to 
some earlier cases. 
In Daimler, the defendant conceded that its subsidiary MBUSA would 
be subject to general jurisdiction in California.574 That is hardly unusual. In 
Goodyear, Goodyear USA did not contest jurisdiction based on the fact that 
it had factories and a workforce in state.575 Those corporate defendants 
seemed to concede that at some point, a large enough presence in state was 
all that a plaintiff had to demonstrate for general jurisdiction. 
Some foreign corporations seemed to have that same understanding of 
and regularly engaged in commercial activity there, did not contest the North Carolina court's 
jurisdiction over it."). 
568 Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 36) ('"(T]he ultimate effect of the 
majority's approach will be to shift the risk of loss from multinational corporations to the 
individuals harmed by their actions.' While the majority expressed little concern for foreign 
plaintiffs suing a foreign defendant for foreign conduct, Justice Sotomayor observed that its 
decision reached farther. She provided examples of cases where the majority opinion appears 
to preclude jurisdiction over claims by U.S. plaintiffs in appropriate state courts." (quoting 
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773)). 
569 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761-62 n.20. 
570 Jd. at 762 n.20 (2014); see also supra p. 28. 
571 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20. 
572 ld. at 763-73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 
(manuscript at 5-6). 
573 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
574 !d. at 758. 
575 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (20 II). 
I~ 
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the law. World-Wide offered a dramatic instance to measure the change 
effected by Daimler. There, not only did the plaintiffs sue the New York 
seller and tri-state distributor.576 They also sued Volkswagen of America and 
Audi.577 Volkswagen initially objected to jurisdiction, but did not pursue the 
matter before the Court.578 Audi apparently did not object even in the trial 
court. 579 Presumably, the plaintiffs would have relied on a showing of the 
extensive contacts between Audi and the forum state. 
After Daimler, jurisdiction over Audi in Oklahoma would be doubtful. 
Despite substantial sales in that state, Audi almost certainly does not have a 
large enough percentage of its sales in state to be "at home" there.580 That 
begs the question of what options would be open to the plaintiffs in such a 
case? 
As implicit in Justice White's opinion, Oklahoma was a convenient 
forum. 581 The seriously burned plaintiffs were treated there, the accident 
took place there, and the wreckage of the vehicle remained there. 582 Had the 
driver of the vehicle who slammed into the Audi been solvent, suit against 
him in Oklahoma would have been appr~riate.583 Indeed, suing him 
elsewhere would not have been feasible.5 Whether jurisdiction over 
Volkswagen in Oklahoma would have been proper is also uncertain, but 
again, as with Audi, doubtful. 585 
New York would not have been a convenient forum. 586 But even if the 
plaintiffs sought to file their action there, jurisdiction may not have been 
proper over all of the parties. Surely, the Oklahoma driver who caused the 
accident was beyond the jurisdictional reach of a New York court.587 
Jurisdiction may have been proper there based on specific jurisdiction as to 
Volkswagen (on the assumption that it acted with purpose vis-a-vis the New 
576 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980). 
577 Jd 
578 Jd. at 288 n.3. 
579 !d. at 288. 
580 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014). 
581 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 294. 
582 Charles W. Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson - The Rest of the Story, 72 
NEB. L. REv. 1122, 1123 ( 1993 ). See also supra note 185. 
583 Adams, supra note 582, at 1127. 
584 Unless the plaintiffs could serve him in hand in some other state, presumably he would 
not be subject to jurisdiction in any other state. 
585 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20. 
586 Most of the events and witnesses were in Oklahoma, not New York. World-Wide, 444 
U.S. at 583-84. 
587 Unless the plaintiffs served the driver in New York, jurisdiction would have been 
improper. Presumably, he had no contacts with New York and certainly none that related to 
the claim against him for negligence. 
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York defendants). 588 Whether Audi could make a plausible objection to 
specific jurisdiction in New York depends on which wing of the Court wins 
the Nicastro debate.589 
Audi is a lot larger than is J. Mcintyre Ltd.590 But assume that attorneys 
for corporations like Audi reconfigure how they do business with their 
United States subsidiaries. For example, J. Mcintyre Ltd., at least according 
to the record, did not direct its subsidiary's marketing activity in the United 
States. 591 Thus, creating a business relationship that formally cedes control 
to one's United States distributor may create immunity from suit even in 
specific jurisdiction cases.592 
Such a result depends on whether Justice Kennedy can persuade either 
Justice Breyer or Alito to join his restrictive view of due process. Given 
Justice Alito 's generally pro-corporate views, further limiting the 
jurisdictional reach of domestic courts is not farfetched. 593 
Nor should one take much comfort in Justice Kennedy's assurances 
that, were Congress to act, federal courts may be amenable to suit in cases 
where a defendant may not have sufficient contacts with a particular state, 
but does with the United States as a whole.594 His statement is premised on 
the fact that such a case would be determined based on Fifth, not Fourteenth, 
Amendment due process.595 In such a case, the contacts would be with the 
588 See supra p. 17. 
589 See supra Part IV.b.ii.A. For example, if a United States subsidiary markets the 
product and solicits business, not the foreign company, the foreign corporation would not have 
act with purpose towards the forum under Justice Kennedy's strict formulation of purposeful 
availment. 
590 Audi 's revenue in 2008 was €34,196 million. Audi 2008 Financial Report, AUDI AG 
(2009), http://www.audi.com/content/dam/corn!EN/investor-relationslfinancial_reports/annual-
reports/2008_audi_annual_financial_report.pdf. J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd.'s revenue in 
2008 was €6.90 million. J Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. Company Profile, YAHOO! FfNANCE, 
http://biz.yahoo.com/id134/ 134!52.htrnl (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
591 J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (20 II). 
592 !d. at 2786, 279 1. 
593 See supra note 22. 
594 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790. 
595 James C. Smith, Comment, Online Communities as Territorial Units: Personal 
Jurisdiction over Cyberspace after J. Mcintyre, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 839, 
858-59 (2013) ("Justice Kennedy 's opinion in J. Mcintyre obliquely refers to the fact that 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k), for state-law claims - which include garden-
variety contract and defamation claims - the jurisdictional reach of the district courts is 
coextensive with that of state courts. Consequently, as of today, if a non-U.S. defendant avoids 
jurisdiction in each of the fifty states, that defendant has also succeeded in avoiding the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Of course, Congress could, through appropriate legislation, 
expand the jurisdiction of the district courts to the outer boundaries of the judicial power of the 
United States as circumscribed in Article Ill of the Constitution. This is the path that Congress 
must take in order for plaintiffs to have reasonable access to the courts to resolve disputes 
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United States as the relevant forum.596 Two problems exist with that 
solution. For one, Congress is dysfunctional.597 Corporations would almost 
certainly pour money into a campaign to defeat such Iegislation.598 
Secondly, some foreign corporations, even those shipping products to the 
United States, may not be subject to personal jurisdiction even in the event 
that Congress enacts a statute authorizing jurisdiction to the full extent of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
Here are two hypotheticals to underscore the second point. Consider a 
case in which a German company has produced a component part 
incorporated into a product assembled by another foreign corporation.599 The 
end producer may be subject to jurisdiction in the United States, but would 
the German company? On these facts alone, that company has not acted with 
purpose towards the United States.600 At most, it has acted with knowledge 
that its product will end up in the forum. As long as the ultimate producer is 
solvent and cannot shift responsibility to the absent would-be defendant, a 
plaintiff may not be at a disadvantage. But if the ultimate producer is 
insolvent, the plaintiffs inability to bring suit against the part' s 
manufacturer (who may be making millions of dollars from the United 
States market) places the injured plaintiff at an obvious disadvantage.601 
originating in online communities."). 
596 !d. 
597 See generally Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz, The Roots of Congressional Discord, 
HUFFINGTON POST, (Oct. 18, 2013, 2:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-debbie-
wasserman-schultz/congress-discord _ b _ 4123 823 .html (detailing the struggles and conflict 
within Congress) . 
598 See, e.g., Nicolas Marceau & Michael Smart, Corporate Lobbying and Commitment 
Failure in Capitol Taxation, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 241, 241 n.3 (2003) (' 'The impact of 
lobbyists on tax policy in the United States has been only informally documented, but the 
evidence suggests that taxation is a primary consideration determining contributions of 
political action committees for many corporations"). 
599 See, for example, LIGHTWEIGHT, https:lllightweight.info/us/enl, which is a German 
Bicycle wheel manufacturer that produces specialty carbon bicycle wheels that then can be 
incorporated into any bicycle frame. The company does not manufacture a complete bicycle, 
therefore to use the wheels they must be attached to a bicycle made by another company, for 
example Raleigh, a British bicycle manufacturer. 
600 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. , 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). 
601 During oral argument in Nicastro, Justice Breyer asked counsel for the plaintiff a 
hypothetical about asserting jurisdiction over a potter in India who made pottery for a larger 
corporation. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 
S. Ct. 2780 (20 II ) (No. 13-25). Justice Kennedy used a similar example of an Appalachian 
potter selling to a larger corporation. J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 
2793 (2011). The thrust of the questions was the obvious unfairness of compelling a producer 
of a product from a far-away venue to appear for suit unless that producer has directed activity 
to the forum. The examples are farfetched because a plainti ff would not bother to sue a person 
making small quantities of goods for a large corporation . Further, jurisdiction in such cases 
might fail because of the fairness aspect of the due process test. By contrast, some component 
276 University of California, Davis [Vol. 21:2 
Harder though would be a case in which a company uses a subsidiary to 
market its product in the United States. Justice Kennedy seemed to assume 
that J. Mcintyre Ltd. would have been subject to jurisdiction under a 
congressionally enacted long-ann statute.602 But depending on how the 
foreign corporation structured its business, it may not have the requisite 
contacts even with the United States as a whole. A corporation that does not 
solicit business, but instead merely responds to another entity's request to 
sell and ship its product to the forum, may not act with the requisite intent to 
affiliate with the forum. 603 As Walden underscores, knowledge that one is 
dealing with the forum is not enough to meet the stringent purposeful 
availment component of the Court's test.604 Thus, if instead of directing 
activity to the forum, a foreign corporation allows a middle man to create the 
contacts with the forum, it may be able to avoid jurisdiction in the United 
States even if Congress enacted an international long-arm statute. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Prior to 1977, a foreign company doing business in the United States 
would be subject to in rem jurisdiction if it maintained assets in the United 
States.605 Shaffer closed that route to assertin£ jurisdiction when the Court 
conflated in rem and in personam jurisdiction. 6 
United States citizens injured abroad could still find a favorable forum 
if the foreign corporation maintained a large enough presence in the United 
States .607 General jurisdiction could be useful in many instances.608 But 
without a clear explanation of its underlying theory, the Court initially, and 
then radically, scaled back its availability.609 
The developments seem at odds with the new smaller world in which 
we live. Commerce and communications bring United States citizens into 
contact with foreign companies far more frequently than at any other time in 
history.610 The Court's begrudging view of due process may effectively 
parts manufacturers are worldwide companies doing millions of dollars of business in many 
states. See, e.g., Newport Components Inc., v. NEC Home Electronics (U.S.A.), Inc., 671 
F.Supp. 1525 (1987) (NEC is a Japanese computer parts manufacturer worth $2 billion doing 
35% of its business internationally with a number of U.S. subsidiaries). 
602 J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780,2790 (2011). 
603 I d. at 2790-91; Asahi, 480 U.S. at 11 2. 
604 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014). 
605 See supra text accompanying note 155. 
606 Shafferv. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,207-13 (1977). 
607 For example, Audi did not object to the Oklahoma court's assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over it. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,288 (1980). 
608 Rhodes, supra note 54. 
609 See supra pp. 22-23. 
6 10 See supra text accompanying notes 553-60. 
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close the courthouse door on United States citizens who are harmed through 
their interactions with foreign companies. 
One might conclude that such a result, a narrowing of in rem and 
general jurisdiction, are justified because specific jurisdiction produces more 
sensible results and expands the reach of domestic courts.611 No doubt, the 
former is often true as laying the venue in a place where a claim arises will 
often result in a convenient place for litigants and witnesses. But depending 
on which wing of the Court wins the purposeful availrnent battle within the 
Court,612 the jurisdictional reach of domestic courts may be shrinking at a 
time when access to justice may demand an expanded jurisdictional reach. 
Further, Justice Kennedy's suggestion of a congressional solution is cold 
comfort given the modem reality in Washington D.C.613 
Plaintiffs' lawyers would be well advised to build detailed records 
during the pretrial motions stage of the proceedings. Figuring out how much 
a plaintiff must show to convince Justices Breyer and Alito that a forei~n 
defendant has sufficient contacts with the United States now looms large.61 
6 11 Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 9 (manuscript at 25) ("Justice Ginsburg repeated the 
theme from Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. that after International Shoe specific 
jurisdiction expanded to become the 'centerpiece of modem jurisdiction theory' while general 
jurisdiction has played 'a reduced role.' The Court views personal jurisdiction as comprising 
two separate sets and reasons that as specific jurisdiction increases, general jurisdiction must 
decrease. While the expanded opportunities for specific jurisdiction have reduced the number 
of siruations where plaintiffs need general jurisdiction, the Court offers no explanation for why 
the constirutional expansion of one set would require a corresponding restriction in the 
other."). 
6 12 See discussion supra Part IV.b.ii.A. 
613 See supra text accompanying notes 597-98. 
614 See supra text accompanying notes 470-78. 
